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Abstract: Technology in the last century has flourished exponentially. Previous fantasies are
becoming cutting-edge discoveries like global communications, encyclopedic knowledge at the
average person’s fingertips, and even medical advances used to improve and extend one’s quality
of life and life expectancy. As technology pushes the boundaries of what is possible, ambitious
visionaries look to solve the arguably greatest problem known to humanity: death.
Transhumanists aiming to use technology to overcome this great human limitation, mortality,
present the newest proposed solutions to life’s oldest challenge. One of these solutions, mind
uploading, is perhaps the most ambitious, but it is not without its own philosophical hindrances.
In contrast, Christian resurrection claims to not only solve the problem of death, it claims to
already have a historical model in the person of Jesus Christ.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 2014, a sci-fi movie starring Johnny Depp featured an AI scientist who, out of
desperation to survive his terminal illness, uploaded his consciousness and began innovating
things like molecular printers, biological enhancements, and a growing society of connected,
enhanced humans who appeared as though they might be plotting to take over the world.1
Theatrics aside, the movie Transcendence offers a high-budget peak into the world of
transhumanism and what it might be like to have one’s consciousness uploaded and survive in
some form as a virtual mind. It addresses challenging ideas like the limitations one may face in a
virtual, disembodied state, having no sensory input short of what someone may plug in for him,
how technology might be used to enhance biological organisms, i.e., humans, and how much
power is needed to continue the growth of just one rapidly-expanding artificial intelligence.
Many other forms of popular culture have touched on these topics ranging from recent
television series like Netflix’s Altered Carbon to classic literary pieces like Mary Shelley’s
Frankenstein, which of course features a scientist using science and cadaver pieces to create life.
There are many themes in these ranges of entertainment media. One common theme in these
movies is that of justice. Nathaniel May performs an in-depth study of several movies featuring
these topics of transhumanism and notices the role that justice plays.2 Ranging from 2001: A
Space Odyssey to The Terminator to X-Men: The Last Stand, each has its own nuanced take on
technology and the impact on the people involved. While May’s observations are correct, there is
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Wally Pfister, Transcendence, Netflix video (Alcon Entertainment, 2014).

Nathaniel D. May, “Transhumanism in Film” (Wake Forest University Graduate School of Arts and
Sciences, 2014), VII.
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another theme common to many of these stories and central to the aims of transhumanists:
immortality.
To understand why immortality is a common focus of transhumanists, the term
“transhumanist” must be clarified. The term is difficult to define consistently and clearly because
the movement is far-reaching and covers many topics. Benjamin Ross echoes this challenge in
defining transhumanism,3 offering the following: “transhumanism is a cultural movement which
advocates a philosophy predicated on the argument that humans ought to transcend the limits
imposed by our biological heritage.”4 Similarly, Max More has also offered several definitions,
one from an early 1990 definition and two variations from a 2003 FAQ session.5 Each of More’s
definitions have a similar theme to those shared by Ross. For example, consider one of the 2003
definitions: “the intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability of
fundamentally improving the human condition through applied reason, especially by developing
and making widely available technologies to eliminate aging and to greatly enhance human
intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities.”6 The common idea emerging from both is a
cultural movement which improves the human condition by transcending human limitations
through technology and science.
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Benjamin Ross, The Philosophy of Transhumanism: A Critical Analysis (Bingley BD16 1WA, UK:
Emerald Publishing Limited, 2020), 2.
4

Ibid., 1.

Max More, “The Philosophy of Transhumanism,” The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and
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Transhumanism’s many branches ultimately strive to overcome human limitations using
technology, and the greatest limitation humans face is death. Immortality has been a subject of
interest for millennia, so the transhumanist’s interest in immortality is not novel. The objective
would be to completely transcend one’s humanity, like Depp did in Transcendence, and become
posthuman, the state of being after one transcends one’s own humanity or human limitations.
Mind uploading may then be viewed as the ultimate success and human eschaton, or at least a
major transition if not an ending. Innovators like Ray Kurzweil elevate human and technological
advance to a supreme position capable of solving the woes and plight of humanity. “It is only by
extending ourselves with intelligent technology that we can deal with the scale of complexity
needed to address [challenges like growing population, overcoming disease, vastly extending
human longevity, and eliminating poverty].”7
Philosophical questions arise in the wake of suggesting that a person’s mind can be
uploaded to a super computer. The mind-body problem and questions of personal identity are
chief among those philosophical questions. How are the mind and body related? Is the mind a
distinct, immaterial substance or merely an emergent property of the complex interactions of
one’s physical brain? Can or does the mind exist apart from the brain? The brain does make the
most sense as the physical seat of the mind. This can be demonstrated through relatively simple
thought experiments. Is a man the same person if he loses his arm or leg? How much of one’s
body can be lost before something essential to personal identity is lost? Even hearts can be
surgically transplanted, but if one’s brain could be transplanted, deep questions of personal
identity emerge. If Abe’s brain is transplanted into Brian’s body, who occupies Brian’s body?
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Consequently, when discussing the mind-body problem throughout this thesis, the body will be
represented by the brain.
Conversely, the mind appears to be something more than a synonym for the brain. Many
modern attempts to reduce mental states to physical explanations have been met with failure.
“[T]he history of ‘standard’ physicalism, that is, the largely reductive physicalism preceding the
contemporary emphasis on emergence, has been one of persistent failure.”8 The “emergence”
referred to here is the idea that mental states are produced, or “emerge,” from physical brainstates, or in Rachel Armstrong’s words, it is “where new features arise from the collective
interaction of more simple systems that take place en masse, at the molecular level.”9 The mind
is thus treated as distinct from the brain but still derived from it. Philosophers like David
Chalmers refer to this as “the hard problem of consciousness.”10 The “hard problem” deals with
experience, according to Chalmers.11 This is the subjective experience common to every person,
not only sensory experiences, but also mental experiences like imagination, emotional
experiences like joy or sorrow, and the intentional focus a mind can place on some object.
Alternatively, the soul is also considered as a means of explaining the mind. The terms
“soul” and “mind” will be used interchangeably here to refer to the immaterial self, but it should
be noted that physicalists, though reluctant to grant a pseudo-immaterial status to mental states

8
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and events, still largely treat the mind as strictly dependent upon the physical.12 Regarding the
soul’s role in explaining the mind, Loose et al. list J. P. Moreland and Richard Swinburne as
modern philosophers seeking alternatives to Descartes’ substance dualism.13 The authors also
note how “some dualists have followed Aristotle and Aquinas” in asking if the soul should be
treated as a distinct substance rather than the “substantial form” of a living human person. These
thinkers will be considered more later.
In seeking an explanation of the mind, many neuroscientists have concluded their
research with an unavoidable conclusion that the mind is distinct from the physical brain.
Habermas and Moreland cite several neuroscientists arriving at these conclusions; Wilder
Penfield, the “acclaimed father of modern neurosurgery,” concluded “[t]here is no place… where
electrical stimulation will cause a patient to believe or to decide. ”14 Similarly, “Roger Sperry
and his associates… discovered that the mind has a causal power independent of brain activity,”
and Richard Restak who “realized that, since willed action cannot be localized in a particular
brain area, this introduces a radical means of understanding the interrelation between mind and
body.”15 To reiterate, given these points, the term “mind” will be used throughout the thesis to
refer to the subjective self, or the first-person referent, which is distinct from the physical brain.
Metaphysical implications are also pertinent for consideration. Immortality naturally
relates to thanatology, the study of death. The irony with the transhumanist is how death

Habermas and Moreland note that “soul” and “mind,” as well as other nuanced terms, should be distinct
in more technical conversations, but the generalization should suffice for this thesis as well. Habermas and
Moreland, Beyond Death, 39.
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becomes a fixation rather than a repellent. Blaise Pascal wrote of how people were compelled to
distract themselves so they could avoid facing the haunting reality of their own mortality. “As
men are not able to fight against death, misery, ignorance, they have taken into their heads, in
order to be happy, not to think of them at all.”16
The transhumanist has swung in the opposite direction from Pascal and the average
people he claimed were distracting themselves from their macabre fates. Rather than avoiding
the thought of death, transhumanists have focused on it to solve or “transcend” it. Death, misery,
and ignorance motivate the transhumanists to achieve immortality, joy, and enlightenment.
Pascal’s following line practically predicts the transhumanist movement: “to be happy he would
have to make himself immortal; but, [sic] not being able to do so, it has occurred to him to
prevent himself from thinking of death.”17 Pascal is not critical of their pursuits per se, but in the
illusion that attaining their goals will ultimately make them happy.18
Pascal himself was a Christian theist. His thoughts on death and the life to come were
framed in that fashion. Conversely, many transhumanists tend to hold a materialist or physicalist
view, which holds that only physical material exists, and all that can be known is reducible to
physical processes. Although, as has been mentioned, even physicalists may reluctantly accept
an immaterial mind, however dependent upon the physical brain it may be. A physicalist
position, however, is not surprising given the common secular attitudes of modern philosophy
and science. Other views are worth consideration as plausible worldviews to use framing the

16

T. S. Eliot, Pascal’s Pensées (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1958), #168.

17

Ibid., #169.

18

Ibid., #139.

6

questions that will be raised throughout this thesis, but this thesis will focus on contrasting
Christianity and transhumanism. Christianity is chosen for reasons others have covered
extensively in a variety of other sources. Topics of natural theology provide many sophisticated
reasons to adopt a theistic worldview, and by extension, one of metaphysical dualism, which will
be discussed more later.19 Other more focused works emphasize Christian theism specifically,
citing reasons like miracles, the ministry of Jesus Christ, and specifically the events surrounding
his execution, death, and resurrection, the ladder of which will also be discussed throughout this
thesis.20
With this focus on transhumanism and Christianity, the question of immortality will be
considered. The focus of this thesis is to establish that mind uploading as a means of personal
immortality fails to achieve its goals due to its inability to preserve the first-person referent, the
self, which is referred to introspectively, and that the Christian concept of resurrection both
satisfies the expectations of immortality as well as providing a purposeful explanation for the
desire to gain immortality.
To establish this focus, first the topic of immortality and how it relates to personal
identity will be discussed. What is immortality? What is the problem of persisting personal
identity? What should one expect from immortality? These questions will be addressed in the

For presentations on natural theology, see W. David Beck, “God’s Existence,” Douglas Geivett and Gary
R. Habermas, eds., In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 1997); William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Natural
Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2012).
19
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For presentations on Christianity in particular, see Josh McDowell, Evidence for Christianity: The
Historical Evidences for the Christian Faith (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, Inc., 2006); Gary R. Habermas and
Michael R. Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2004). See also
Craig, “The Empty Tomb of Jesus,” and Habermas “The Resurrection Appearances of Jesus,” In Defense of
Miracles. For a broad defense of theism and Christianity, see Douglas Groothuis, Christian Apologetics: A
Comprehensive Case for Biblical Faith (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2011).
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following chapter. Once the expectations for immortality have been set, the next chapter after
that will consider immortality through the lens of mind uploading. More details will be provided
regarding what is meant by the term, how it might be done, and powerful existential questions
regarding one’s humanity and personal identity. Finally, beyond that, the Christian resurrection
will be assessed as a means of immortality, what that might look like, and how Jesus is the
historical model for the resurrection.

8

Chapter 2
Immortality and Personal Identity
Understanding what is meant by the term “immortality” is important in achieving it as a
goal, be that for the transhumanist, the Christian, the ancient Greek, or whomever. This chapter
will begin by discussing what is meant by immortality and what views have been used when
thinking about it. This will help reveal what is yearned for when a person dreams about
everlasting life. Immortality naturally raises important questions on the nature of personal
identity and the metaphysical considerations involved in how a person is distinct from others but
identical to itself over time if it is. The chapter will conclude with a proposed set of requirements
for what constitutes a successfully immortal state based on the views and metaphysical details
that were discussed.
What is Immortality?
Immortality should be defined in such a way as to encapsulate the desires motivating an
immortal state of being. With its long and variegated history in human thinking, immortality has
taken many definitions. A simple definition comes from N. T. Wright: “a state in which death is
not possible.”21 Is this state one of eternal life? Is perpetual, disembodied death a state in which
further death is not possible, and does that count as immortality? Does some form of “after life”
follow one’s death? Does such a question make sense? Gabriel Andrade draws attention to the
nebulous nature of death and its role in discussing immortality as the semantic problem of
death.22 Worldview plays a strong role in how “death” is understood. “We usually define [death]
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N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, vol. 3, Christian Origins and the Question of God
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 164.

Gabriel Andrade, “Immortality,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed September 14, 2021,
https://iep.utm.edu/immortal/.
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in physiological terms as the cessation of biological functions that make life possible… To be
immortal is, precisely, not to suffer death. Thus, whoever dies, stops existing; nobody may exist
after death, precisely because death means the end of existence.”23 24
At first glance, it appears Andrade holds to a physicalist worldview. However, it is worth
noting that not only physicalists believe in ontological cessation at death. For example, a
“recreation position” may be taken for theists where “a person [becomes exist at death], and at
the general resurrection God recreates the person, not from preexisting materials but out of
nothing.”25 Habermas and Moreland are critical of this view but list it as alternative views to
what they call “the traditional outlook” where, at death, a person “is translated into an entirely
different nonspatial mode of existence… [and immediately] into the presence of God.”26 Other
nuanced views exist, but for clarity, this thesis will treat postmortem cessation of being as the
physicalist position and the “traditional outlook” as the general Christian position. Worldviews
aside, Andrade is right in pointing out this semantic tension between life and death, prompting
the question, “What does it mean to live forever?”
To begin with, immortality in its weakest meaning will not be considered throughout this
thesis. This weakest meaning is to refer to the expression that one may live on in people’s
memories or as a legend or icon of fame or infamy. Andrade also considers this “vague and
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See the section “1. Semantic Problems.” Ibid.

Clearly Andrade holds a physicalist worldview. Also note that the terms “physicalism,” “materialism,”
and “scientific naturalism” will be used synonymously throughout this thesis to refer to the view that only the
material world exists and immaterial substances like the soul do not exist.
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general,” using the enduring memory of Babe Ruth as an example of immortality via enduring
memory. Beyond these immortal memories are ancient stories of heroes striving for immortality,
and among those stories is one of the oldest stories in history, or at least Mesopotamian history:
The Epic of Gilgamesh. In response to the death of Gilgamesh’s friend, Enkidu, Gilgamesh
becomes obsessed with a quest for immortality.27 His journey takes him through many
adventures, even to finding one human who gained immortality through his deeds, Utnapishtim,
who is the hero of the story’s floor narrative.28 Gilgamesh’s objective in seeking immortality is
clearly more than just being remembered. He yearns for everlasting life; he aims to avoid dying
like Enkidu. Gilgamesh, or more accurately, the people retelling the tale over the years and the
author who carved it into the tablets archaeologists possess today, viewed immortality as an
indefinite continuation of bodily life.
Is an embodied life strictly necessary for immortality? Some transhumanists think not,
such as the proponents of mind uploading, who advocate that immortality may be more
exotically defined. Ray Kurzweil refers to “limitless thinking” as a form of immortality.29
Kurzweil’s view of future immortality holds that humans will upload their minds or
consciousness and exist virtually, and as a result of this virtual existence, “software-based
humans will be vastly extended beyond the severe limitations of humans as we know them
today,” and these “[software-based] humans will be able to expand their thinking without

Thomas Van Nortwick, Somewhere I Have Never Travelled: The Hero’s Journey (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 10.
27
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Ibid., 11.
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Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near - When Humans Transcend Biology (New York: Viking Penguin,
2005), 325.
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limit.”30 The only limitation for such humans will be the chore of maintaining one’s “mind file”
via regular backups and updating as it becomes available. How frequently this should happen
likely depends on how it becomes available or what resources a person has. Would it be
expensive? What hardware is required? Many of these answers are unavailable and can only be
speculated about for now. The details of mind uploading will be discussed more in the next
chapter. Immortality via mind uploading reflects current human self-care for longevity and
quality of life; current biological self-care via eating well, exercise, and rest would be replaced
by the kind of software-care that goes into modern devices like computers and smart devices.
Doing so would allow the virtual person to exist indefinitely into the future. Clearly, the human
imagination and creativity has not waned in recent decades.
While the methods of attaining immortality may vary over time, there are common
themes that even the ancient story of Gilgamesh and the very recent Kurzweilian predictions
share: a persisting self inextinguishable by death. While the pursuit of immortality is no new
project, humans have not yet discovered a way around physical death. Despite this fatal
inevitability, three prominent frameworks for considering immortality have risen over time, as
outlined by Andrade.31 To be clear, these frameworks do not avoid the specter of death; instead,
they propose ways that the self may continue consciously even after death. Consequently, each
of the views requires a metaphysical commitment to some form of dualism rather than
physicalism.

30

Ibid.
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See section “Three Models of Immortality,” Andrade, “Immortality.”
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Before covering Andrade’s outline of immortality, what might a physicalist form of
immortality entail? Transhumanism offers insight into what immortality may look like. Mind
uploading, which is one of the main topics of this thesis, is one such suggested approach, and
arguably the most ambitious approach. Bio-engineering is another approach where the science of
aging cells becomes better understood and is manipulated so aging ceases or slows. Advances in
biology like the cutting-edge gene-editing CRISPR/Cas9 platform have enabled researchers to
edit genes and create medicines by manipulating life at the most fundamental levels.32 Similarly,
Altos Labs in the UK has been funded by Jeff Bezos to continue pursuing technology to prolong
life and slow or reverse the aging process.33 These are just some of the recent ways physicalists
have proposed how to defeat death using technology and ambition, but how have the ancients
considered immortality?
The Astral Body
First is the view that an immaterial soul simply leaves the body at death and wanders
about the earth. This is the view proposed when people report to have seen ghosts or experienced
some haunting. These reports tend to be dubious in nature, and the veracity of the view is outside
the scope of this thesis, but for believers in ghosts and hauntings, it is a kind of evidence in favor
of the existence of the soul and the spiritual realm. Andrade refers to this ghostly presence as
“the astral body,” though he is sharply critical of some implications of the view, specifically the
idea that the astral body is clothed rather than naked, which he dismisses as “too extravagant to
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“Mission,” CRISPR, accessed October 6, 2021, http://www.crisprtx.com/about-us/mission.
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be taken seriously.”34 This view is a part of popular culture as well. Both film and literature tell
stories which abound with ghosts that have not “moved on” yet. For example, Patrick Swayze
stars in a movie called Ghost following this theme. Similarly, Andrade refers to Hamlet’s ghost.
Paranormal television shows and movies abound in the 21st century, and this only acts as a lens
into the modern fascination with ghosts and the afterlife.
While these interests are largely for entertainment purposes, many funeral and ceremonial
practices indicate this same belief that the dead is present, perhaps at their burial site, and active
in the world. N. T. Wright describes ancient ceremonial practices of eating with the dead where
people prepare food and drink for deceased loved ones at the place of their burial, also citing
Egyptian burial and mummification practices to provide the deceased with physical materials to
be used in the afterlife.35 All of this reveals the ways in which people demonstrate either their
fascination with the dead, for modern media productions would not be made were there not
sufficient demand to warrant the work and cost involved, or their reverence for the dead,
indicative in ancient funerary practices and festivals, for example, the still-practiced Día de los
Muertos.36 Proponents of the view offer it as a way to explain how a person’s soul endures
beyond death into some kind of astral-bodied afterlife.
One may draw a parallel here between the proposition of uploaded minds existing
virtually with the idea of an astral body. Kurzweil suggests the “software-based,” virtual human
minds might interact with the physical world using holograms or nanobot swarms to produce

34

Andrade, “Immortality.”
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Wright, Son of God, 61-62.
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Another modern example overlapping both the interest in the dead in media entertainment and traditional
funerary festivals, i.e., Día de los Muertos, is the movie Coco. Adrian Unkrich and Adrian Molina, Coco, Disney+
video (Disney Pixar, 2017).
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tangible bodies.37 There are similarities between the astral and virtual person visiting an
embodied person: the disembodied person would visit the embodied person, either to comfort or
offer wisdom from “beyond the grave.” Wright notes numerous ancient stories of people
interacting with the dead for just such reasons.38 These similarities between the astral and virtual
disembodied person are only superficially similar though. The metaphysical view of Kurzweil is
that of metaphysical materialism which rejects the existence of souls or astral bodies. Similarly,
Christian theism, which shares theological roots with Judaism, concedes that, while such contact
with the dead is in some form possible, it is to be avoided (Lev. 20:27; Deut. 18:10-11).39 Thus,
the astral, disembodied existence is not a viable means of personal immortality for neither the
transhumanist nor the Christian theist.
The Immaterial Soul
The second framework to consider is a Platonic view of the afterlife. This view shares
with the first some form of substance dualism, but this Platonic view treats the immaterial
substance, not as some astral body mimicking the person’s appearance, but instead as an
immaterial soul which is without spatial dimensions and therefore unsensible. Plato writes of this
view in Phaedo through the teachings of Socrates prior to his execution. Additionally, contra
Homer, Plato wrote about how the embodied life is a prison of sorts which clouds the soul from
truth and critical thinking; it is the “source of endless trouble” due bodily distractions like the

Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near, 325. Some have assembled libraries of Kurzweil’s ideas and patents
to demonstrate concepts like this, e.g., the “Utility Fog” or nanotech “foglet.” Storrs Hall, Kurzweil: Tracking the
acceleration of intelligence, July 5, 2001, accessed September 25, 2021. https://www.kurzweilai.net/utility-fog-thestuff-that-dreams-are-made-of.
37
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Wright, Son of God, 62-68.
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Wright also notes 1 Samuel 28 when Saul consults a medium, “where such contact was an anathema.”

Ibid., 63.
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need to eat, the tendency to fall ill, and the emotional attractions of “loves, and lusts, and fears,
and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery.”40
Wright also comments on this Platonic view, citing Cicero and his “mainstream of GrecoRoman thinking,” when he quotes Cicero as having said, “‘Nobody in their right mind, having
got rid of [their body], would want it or something like it back again.”41 Furthermore, Norman
Geisler frames the Platonic view of death as a kind of salvation for the soul, freed from its
corporeal prison; “salvation is in part deliverance from the body” (emphasis Geisler’s).42
The Platonic view is inversely related to the transhumanist view. Where the Platonist
asserts the soul, which is good, is really the person and the body, which is evil, is a distraction
and prison, the transhumanist rejects the existence of the soul in general and asserts the body is
the real self and worth preserving. Max More highlights this as one of the misconceptions people
have about the transhumanist movement in general, namely, because many transhumanists
adhere to scientific naturalism and the view that their bodies are the products of, in Richard
Dawkins’ words, “a blind watchmaker,” transhumanists simply want to choose which kind of
body they inhabit.43
Similarly, the Platonic anthropological and thanatological views differ significantly from
the Christian views on said topics, but they are not without their similarities. A variety of
Christian views on metaphysical anthropology exist. René Descartes’ anthropological views

40

Plato, Phaedo, trans. Benjamin Jowett, 27, Kindle.
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Wright, Son of God, 60.
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MI: Baker Books, 2012), 256.
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More, Transhumanist Reader, 15.
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represent a common, relatively modern perspective on Christian anthropology; the body and soul
are distinct and separate “substances,” which is like the Platonic view, and the self is the soul or
mind, which will be used interchangeably when speaking of Cartesian substance dualism.44
Descartes arrives at this conclusion of the distinct nature of the soul from the body by doubting
his body’s existence and granting the possibility by merit of its logical possibility.
Richard Swinburne parses Descartes’ “I am thinking and I have no body,” stating that it
entails the meaning “I exist and I have no body,” which is conceivable.45 Similarly, Descartes
concludes he must not be “a collection of members which we call the human body… because I
have assumed that all these were nothing.”46 On this distinct nature of the soul and body, Plato
and Descartes agree, but Descartes does not hold the negative Platonic view of the body. In fact,
Descartes saw the soul intentionally functioning “as part of the union, specifically to receive and
to interpret sensation, and to direct the body to respond in that way that avoids what is harmful
and attracts what is beneficial.”47 Far from being trapped in the body, distracted by its sensations,
the soul is to experience and direct the body. This is a clear difference in one Christian view
from the Platonist.
The human body is not an evil thing or substance. This should not be confused with
passages where the spirit and “flesh” are contrasted from one another. Romans 8 provides an
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example of this teaching, but rather than the flesh being a fundamentally evil thing which only
impedes, Paul is writing about the flesh’s failure to provide salvation and manifest right moral
behavior and attitudes. The contrast between flesh and “God’s Sprit” is apparent in “mind-set,
the results of one’s concerns, and one’s attitude toward God and God’s law.”48 While the
Christian view may treat “the flesh” as corrupted, the source of human error, it is not the physical
body per se that causes the issue. It is the fleshly “nature,” a pattern of behavior, that is the
problem. This contrasts the Platonic view of the body which only serves to distract and tempt
people away from true philosophical inquiry, i.e., salvation. The Christian theist’s view of the
body is not a prison from which the soul or “inner self” must be freed. It is to re-embodiment via
the resurrection that ultimately transforms the person into a “spiritual being.”49 Its desires and
hungers are contextually appropriate and, given the central role Jesus’ incarnate human life and
re-embodied resurrection plays, it is clear embodiment is good. Like the astral body framework,
Platonism is incompatible with both transhumanism and Christian theism.
The Resurrected Body
The third framework to consider for immortality is that of bodily resurrection. This view
of immortality is shared by the three major Abrahamic religions and expects that dead bodies
will be resurrected, and disembodied souls will be re-embodied in their original bodies for final
judgment. The question may be raised, “What does it mean to be resurrected in the same body as
the one someone died in?” According to Geisler, one’s resurrection must be into the same
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physical body to count as embodied immorality, or more specifically, if Jesus was not raised in
his same physical body to new life, Christians have no hope of victory over death either.50
This can be taken to mean, at least, that the resurrected body should have the same
properties it had prior to death, possibly barring any accidental changes or deficiencies incurred
during life. For example, if a person was blinded during life, it is conceivable that the resurrected
body would possess sight given it would be a property of properly-functioning human bodies. On
a Christian view, healing from such deficiencies is expected in a resurrected state, but there may
be reasons for retaining some bodily evidence of injuries obtained during life.51
Taking it a step further, does the resurrected body have the same cells and matter as the
body which died? This is a more difficult position to hold, but there is not a strong reason to hold
it. Over the course of the average human lifespan, one’s cells are replaced. Geisler noted in a
Thomistic/Aristotelean fashion that the expression “same body” means “the same substantial and
continuous material body, whatever accidental changes there may be in its given molecules.”52
Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysical view has influenced Geisler’s; the idea Geisler was conveying
was that the sum total particular atoms do not make a body belong to a person but that the body
belongs to a person because its substantial form is diachronically identical over time. If the body
dies, the soul can be reinstantiated materially, i.e., it can be re-embodied, and that reinstantiated
body would belong to the person because it would be the material manifestation of the person’s
substantial soul. “Since the soul is united to the body as its form, and since each form has the
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right matter corresponding to it, the body to which the soul will be reunited must be of the same
nature and species as was the body laid down by the soul at death.”53
Aquinas’ idea of “soul” is quite different from the Cartesian meaning of the term.
Aquinas, like Aristotle, did not treat the material and immaterial as distinct substances of the
human, but as two components of the same substance. This is known as hylomorphism.54 The
soul is the animating force which moves the body and gives it life.55 The soul as a substantial
form also animates the incorporeal operations of the human, as Feser explains. At death the
“[corporeal powers] of that substance are no longer manifest, while the [incorporeal powers]
continue.”56 Whatever incorporeal operations may exist apart from the soul’s corporeal presence,
which would include the five empirical senses and bodily extension in space and time, those
incorporeal operations would continue apart from any physical presence. These might be things
like self-reflection or self-awareness, depending on what a disembodied state’s experience is
like. Feser notes this is a greatly diminished and incomplete state of existence, but it is existence
nonetheless.57 In this way, a disembodied soul would be severely deprived in nature, like a living
person lacking almost all his empirical senses. So, while the body may die or be destroyed, the
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soul’s continued existence ensures a continuity of personal identity over time in the absence of a
physical body as Geisler proposed.
Andrade rightly points out that the Resurrected Body framework for immortality faces
serious difficulties if dualism or the soul is denied. Resurrection in some form is not impossible
if the soul is denied. Such a view where personal identity is based on the body or psychology, as
will be covered in the next section, could offer explanation for a person being brought back to
life. If God is permitted in the scenario, God could raise the person’s identical body back to life,
or even just place the person’s memories in a similar body. Alternatively, if cloning procedures
were advanced enough and allowed to replicate human bodies, that would provide a sort of
immortality. Also, if technology were exceptionally advanced and adept at duplicating one’s
brain perfectly from some snapshot in time, some brain state captured by scan or preservation of
the organ itself, maybe the pattern of psychological features could “resurrect” a person, but these
suggestions are farfetched and largely conjectured.
Suppose for arguments sake that the resurrection of the body is granted. Two further
questions arise in response to it. First is the question of how one knows the resurrected body is
properly ensouled with the same soul that inhabited the body originally. This sparks the problem
with persisting personal identity, and it will be addressed in the next section. The second
question regards the intermediate state between life and resurrection, i.e., the body’s death state.
For both the Jew and the Christian, this intermediate state is one where the disembodied soul
retains some level of consciousness and self-awareness. Daniel 12:13 is an important verse for
the Jew and Christian speaking directly of this intermediate state saying “[Daniel] will rest” and
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rise again in the last days.58 Wright contrasts this against “Plato, Cicero, and other expressions of
the classic ‘astral immortality.’”59 Death does not introduce the soul immediately into a state of
immortality, nor the resurrection; first is an intermediate state.60 Wright goes so far as to say that
the idea of an immediate resurrection or state of immortality is completely without support in
second-temple Jewish thinking when Christianity began.61
Habermas and Moreland also extensively cover this intermediate state, considering both
the traditional view that has just been briefly discussed, as well as several non-traditional
alternatives and reasons they are less likely to be true.62 The main points Habermas and
Moreland offer in support of the traditional view come from the New Testament documents, the
source of traditional Christian thinking. Specifically, Paul’s desire to be present with Christ (Phil.
1:23) which means being “away from the body and at home with the Lord” (2 Cor. 5:8).
Similarly, two stories present the deceased in conscious states: the parable of Lazarus and the
rich man and the apocalyptic vision of the righteous martyrs seeking justice from God. Habermas
and Moreland make the point that these two stories should not be pressed too far, especially
related to spatial details, but the expressions of the parable and the vision depict those who have
died as being conscious after death.63
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Given the centrality of the resurrection of the body in Christianity, there is obviously no
conflict between the third framework of immortality and Christianity. However, transhumanism
conditionally clashes with the resurrection of the body model. This condition depends on the
transhumanist’s metaphysical views. The materialist will reject the view partly due to most
people dying before the promised resurrection occurs, so there is a significant article of faith
involved which the materialist does not hold.64 However, for any transhumanists that are also
substance dualists, bodily resurrection is not out of the question. Consequently, there can be
overlapping dialog between the transhumanist and the Christian. Kraftchick cites and agrees with
Heidi Campbell on the three areas of conversation both views share: a shared longing for
transformation in eschatological terms, the place of the human in the world, and an ethical
framework for the human’s role in said transformation.65
Similarly, but more critically, Knut Alfsvåg believes Christian ethics should remain
critical of “biotechnology,” which is central to transhumanism, that seeks to transform humans in
radical ways.66 Alfsvåg grants that the two views look forward to relief from illness and death,
but he concludes the division is due to conflicting expectations. One is that “the Christian idea of
improvement does not entail liberation from embodiment,” and in fact looks forward to reembodiment at the resurrection as has been discussed already. Transhumanism does not, by
necessity, seek to abolish the body per se, but as More mentioned, transhumanists do want the
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freedom to choose what kind of body they inhabit, if at all.67 The other reason for the divide is
that Christians do not expect the transformation to be accomplished by human efforts; instead, it
is offered as a divine gift. Transhumanists, especially physicalists, have no interest in waiting for
a promised gift they do not believe will come. The divide between the transhumanist and the
Christian regarding human transformation and immortality is fundamentally metaphysical, and
as a result, irreconcilable.
After having considered these different views of immortality, the common subject
through them all is the persistence of self and personal identity indefinitely into the future. The
reason to focus on “self and personal identity” is because one’s worldview and how preservation
of self is executed will affect whether one’s brain or body is necessary for the persistence of the
self. For example, the Platonist looking forward to preservation is not relying on the brain or
body to survive; only the immaterial soul must survive for the self to endure, which is the
sought-after goal for the Platonist.68 Conversely, the transhumanist may want to preserve her
physical brain if she thinks it is the locus of her personal identity. Alternatively, an uploaded
mind, as will be discussed more in the following chapter, may only need to mimic the brain
virtually to preserve one’s personal identity, if possible.
Thus, throughout the thesis, immortality will refer to self which persists indefinitely into
the future. It is worth noting here that if Wright’s simple definition of immortality is used, i.e.,
that death is an impossibility for an immortal, then no form of transhumanist techno-immortality
would qualify. No amount of technology can permanently prevent death in all its forms. Even if
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immortality were achieved by mind uploading, for example, the uploaded mind would still be
dependent upon the new substrate to continue “living.” Therefore, the “indefinitely-persisting
self” definition of immortality will be used in the interest providing a definition that at least
allows the possibility of mind uploading. Having now defined immortality as an “indefinitelypersisting self,” the problem of persisting identity has returned and will now be considered.
The Problem of Persisting Personal Identity
Immortality naturally prompts discussions on the problem of persisting personal identity.
What causes a person at t1 to be the same as the person at t2 and onward until tn? The three
frameworks or modes of immortality from the previous section demonstrate how the question of
personal identity centers on some concept of immaterial soul, be it an astral substance, an already
immortal substance, or a potentially immortal substance meant to be embodied. What is it about
the soul that commonly fixes the discussion of personal identity on itself? As it is traditionally
understood, the soul as a locus of the self provides a clear explanation for how someone can
change over time. Even to discuss the idea of something or someone changing over time, there
must be some common referent as the object of consideration.
Even inanimate objects have what might be called a “loose, popular sense of identity.”69
One example of loose identity might be what Gallois calls the Cup and Tcup, where “Cup” refers
to a tea cup or mug that is whole, and “Tcup” refers to the “truncated cup” with its handle broken
off, hence, “Tcup.”70 A loose identity grants the Tcup is identical to the Cup despite its total
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composition being less than the Cup prior to being broken. Similarly, a sports team is loosely
identical to itself over time despite potential change of players, coaches, managers, mascots, and
even inanimate things like slogans, marketing, logos, or brands. Any of these details may change
over time, but the team may remain the same in a loose, popular sense. Another classic
illustration of this issue is the Ship of Theseus.
The Ship of Theseus thought experiment asks if a ship’s identity is the same or different
after the parts of the ship are steadily replaced over time. The issue is complicated further if the
parts that were replaced are used to be reassembled into another ship, thereby reconstructing “the
original” ship but resulting now in two ships. As was mentioned with the team illustration, there
is an “absolute, strict sense of identity” at play where the ship is different as soon as a part is
replaced.71 Strict identity follows Leibnitz’s law of the indiscernibility of identicals: “for any x
and for any y, if ‘they’ are identical to each other, then for any property P, P will be true of x if
and only if P is true of y.”72 Among some of the lessons learned from the Ship of Theseus,
according to Moreland and Craig, it appears that artifacts cannot maintain a strict identity but,
instead, must be identified loosely by some arbitrary definition of parts that persist over time.73
Given these differences in senses of identity, what can be said of personal identity?
Criteria for Personal Identity
Commonly discussed when determining personal identity are the criteria for personal
identity. These are typically broken up into three criteria: “soul, body, and psychological
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continuity.”74 To help illustrate and test each criterion, consider a heinous tyrant guilty of the
worst behavior known to man. The 20th century has had plenty to choose from, so someone on
par with Hitler, Stalin, Mao, or Pot should suffice. This tyrant will help illustrate each criteria’s
viability.
First, what Craig and Moreland call the “absolute [or simple] view of personal identity”
points to an entity, the soul, as the source of personal identity which is absolute, indivisible, and
“does not come in degrees” or partials.75 This will be referred to as the soul criterion. This view
explains how a disembodied, deceased person might maintain personal identity even in death;
“sameness of soul is what constitutes personal identity through change, even death.”76 This calls
back to Daniel 12:13 where he is told he will rest until “the end of the days [when] you will rise
to receive your allotted inheritance.” Daniel could not keep his personal identity through his
“rest” and receive his “allotted inheritance” if his personal identity was lost in death.
Swinburne agrees with the indivisibility of the soul on this view; this follows his
consideration of the classic split-brain thought experiment which questions which brain would
house his identity were it split and placed in two separate bodies.77 Swinburne notes that he is
still fully himself after the split and that “there is no room for [the other consciousness] to be me,
even in small part.”78 Similar thought experiments, including the split-brain, will come up in
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later chapters. It should also be noted, much like this thesis uses “soul” and “mind”
interchangeably, that Swinburne treats the term “soul” as interchangeable with “mind.”79
Swinburne holds to the soul criterion of personal identity.
The challenges that face the soul criterion are related to the questions on how it might
know a resurrected person was really the same person. For example, if the illustrative tyrant is
resurrected in an Abrahamic sense for final judgment by a sufficiently competent judge, is it safe
to expect that the tyrant raised for judgment will be the same tyrant that lived and committed the
acts to be judged? Yes, the competent judge would have the means for rationally and justly
judging the tyrant for his life’s actions. If the re-embodied soul were not the tyrant, it would
make no sense and would be utterly unjust to judge anyone by the tyrant’s actions other than the
tyrant himself. The soul criterion holds up.
Second is the body criterion which holds that personal identity is associated with body
itself. To hold this view rationally and still maintain that a person maintains some identity over
time, a loose view of identity is required. The same issues that plague the Ship of Theseus face
the body criterion, metaphysically speaking. The body, including the brain, regularly replaces its
cells over time, so the strict molecules composing the body must not be the requirement or else
no one is ever the same person over time as cells are replaced. This view also calls back to the
discussion earlier regarding whether a resurrected body must be made of the same matter or not.
The body and brain already undergo a Theseus-like series of part replacement. Consequently, the
loose identity view must be held. To reiterate an earlier illustration, it would appear most body
parts can be replaced without questioning the person’s identity, but upon considering
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replacement of one’s brain, questions of personal identity naturally arise. Even substance dualists
like Swinburne grant that the brain appears to be the seat of consciousness for the physical
body.80
So, if the brain is selected as the assembly of parts by which the body is the measure of
personality, what problems does this view face? One has already been mentioned regarding
Swinburne’s claim that the soul or mind cannot be divided into partials. Granted, Swinburne was
speaking of the mind being indivisible, even if the brain is, but the question here regards what in
the brain is responsible for personal identification. To return to the illustration of the tyrant, if he
sought to evade capture by undergoing the split-brain procedure where the two halves went to
separate bodies of his coerced subjects, and assuming the procedure successfully produced two
conscious people, which person would deserve the punishment for the tyrant’s acts should one or
both be captured? The temptation may be to punish both, but is that a just punishment? Which
body holds the person responsible for the tyrannous acts, the tyrant other or one’s self?
Concluding this type of scenario, Moreland and Craig offer two important points. “First, a person
is not identical to his body or his memories and character traits… [Second], persons are not
capable of partial identity and survival as are physical objects.”81 The two conscious people are
new people and cannot be identified with the initial tyrant.
Additionally, if personal identity is located strictly in the body, some kind of continuity
must loosely identify the person in the same way the Ship of Theseus is the “same ship.” This
presents challenges for advocates of bodily resurrection since the body would likely be
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decomposed over time for most people through history. If some deity was to recreate the body
exactly as it were at death, the body would be totally new and have a new bodily continuity, even
if the behaviors and brain-states were “the same” as before. There is no obvious difference
between this recreated body and a perfectly cloned body apart from the effective causes. To
illustrate, could the tyrant who escaped the courts be cloned, tried, judged, and punished? Such
an idea mocks one’s sense of justice. The body view is replete with insurmountable issues of
identity, especially when it comes to preserving the FPR, whether that be for the individual’s
preservation or for the enacting of ultimate justice.
The third criterion to consider is the psychological, or memory, view. Andrade explains
John Locke’s view how identity is determined by consciousness or memories, i.e., psychological
details.82 The self is a culmination of the psychological traits possessed by a person, so
memories, interests, preferences, and the like determine one’s identity.
This criterion is more favorable for physicalists as it can be explained in naturalistic
ways, but how well does it hold up? Consider once more the tyrant. If the tyrant and another
person somehow had their memories switched, the result would be the tyrant’s memories in the
other person’s body (OT) and the other person’s memories in the tyrant’s body (TO). Now
suppose TO was captured by enemy forces trying to stop him and bring him to justice. Would the
enemy forces be judging the right person TO instead of OT? From the outside perspective, TO
would appear to be the target, but if the captive has no memory of the actions and is appalled by
the accusation, can that person be the same tyrant? It would seem OT should be held accountable
since the memories, behavior, and apparent psychology of the tyrant reside there.
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Conversely, if the tyrant suffered a serious blow to the head that caused amnesia and
recalled none of his previous actions, would he still be responsible for his crimes? The surviving
victims would certainly think so. This scenario reveals a fault in the psychological continuity
view of personal identity. Loss of one’s memories does not change who the person is, i.e.,
memory loss does not change the first-person referent who is the focus of introspection. It only
changes what that self-referential “I” remembers about himself. For the proposition “the tyrant
lost his memories” to be a logical chain of events, it is required that the tyrant be the subject
experiencing the memories loss. For these reasons, it would appear this criterion of psychology,
namely the possession of one’s memories, is insufficient for establishing personal identity.
Having considered the criteria of the soul, body, and mind, the soul criterion best
captures what is expected when trying to identify a person over time due to its absolute,
indivisible nature. The body criterion struggles with maintaining identity during radical bodily
changes, especially when dealing with the brain which typically represents the seat of
consciousness; this will be more relevant as mind uploading is discussed in the next chapter. The
memory criterion suffers issues of coherence in a consistent subject of experience remaining “the
same” through a sequence of events, e.g., memory loss. Personal identity in the soul does not
allow for strange scenarios like those covered with the body or psychological criteria. By
extension, this restricts metaphysical views to those compatible with the personal soul.
Metaphysical Considerations
First, recall how the terms “soul” and “mind” are being used interchangeably in this
thesis. Then, considering the criteria explored, the accompanying metaphysical views will now
be considered regarding how compatible they are with the personal soul. Physicalism is clearly
incompatible with the soul as described in the criteria above. It comes close with concepts of
31

emergent properties which are said to form when matter becomes sufficiently complex to cause
patterns to emerge, but it does not mesh with the results of the criteria for personality and faces
the same hurdles as the body and psychological criteria. Additionally, Habermas and Moreland
present a strong case establishing that the brain and mind do not share the same “properties,
states, and dispositions,” which reinforces the difference between the brain and mind.83
The brain and mind do not possess the same properties, so where the brain’s properties
may possess electrical charge, chemical makeup, weight, or spatial location, mental properties do
not. Mental details are also self-presenting, privately known, and incorrigible to the subject.
Observers may infer via brain scans what the subject is thinking or feeling, but the details must
be confirmed by the thinking subject before the observing subject can be certain of the specific
mental contents. Similarly, the nature of experience is purely subjective, so whatever the stimuli
may be, the experiences per se are real experiences for the subject. Additionally, secondary
qualities like “colors, tastes, sounds, smells, and textures” cannot be reduced to primary qualities
like “weight, shape, size, solidity, [or] motion.” Color may possess wavelengths which trigger
optic receptors and send signals to the brain, but the subjective experience of secondary qualities
like redness or blueness are real experiences in the mind. Finally, intentionality is a kind of
mental state that purposefully refers to some object of consideration. This intentional
consideration can manifest as a desire, e.g., “John wants a burger,” or the sensation of it, e.g.,
“John tastes a burger.” These points are Habermas and Moreland’s case for dualism over
physicalism.

83

Habermas and Moreland, Beyond Death, 48-54.

32

Of the points listed above, intentionality is an important one. Moreland and Craig make a
similar point, describing intentionality as “a natural affinity or intrinsic directedness towards its
intentional object.”84 Elsewhere, they define intentionality as “the ofness or aboutness of the
mind,” and that the mental state “is always a state of or about something beyond it.”85
Particularly interesting is how the intentional mental state does not have to be about something
that exists; it could be about something like the Greek god Zeus or a mystical creature like a
phoenix. These intentional mental states are properties the physical brain cannot contain in the
same way they do properties like size, charge, or spatial orientation.
Similarly, Feser notes intentionality’s “capacity to represent, refer, or point beyond itself”
is an example of “natural phenomena difficult to account for in mechanistic terms.”86 Feser also
highlights how intentionality has a teleological aspect in that the directedness of the thoughts are
an end or goal of the mental state like Aristotle’s analysis of “the generation of the flame and
heat as its final cause.”87 Finally, Feser lists this directedness as one of the disqualifying features
as to why neuroscientific findings could not threaten the immateriality of intentionality, or stated
otherwise, intentionality could never be accounted for on strictly mechanistic terms. “Nothing
devoid of final causality can possess the directedness characteristic of intentionality.”88 As
represented by Feser, the Thomistic/Aristotelean view of hylomorphism rests comfortably in
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accordance with neuroscientific findings because they will only be able to describe the matter,
not its form.
Habermas and Moreland further defend substance dualism against property dualism.89
Property dualism states that “the brain is the real possessor of [the] mental life.”90 The brain is
not something which possesses consciousness. Through a “basic awareness of the self,” the
subject can be aware that she is the one having experiences and is not the set of experiences
herself. This also means there is “no amount of third-person descriptions [that] captures my own
subjective, first-person” experiences. This calls back to the example of an observer reading brain
scans being unable to capture the subject’s private inner experiences fully by scans alone. As has
also been discussed, personally identity is best explained by the soul criterion. “Personal identity
is constituted by sameness of soul, not sameness of body or mental abilities.”91 Finally, free will,
morality, personal responsibility, reward, and punishment depend on identity enduring as the
soul endures. This echoes what was said regarding the soul criterion for the same reasons.
Before proceeding, some versions of substance dualism should be addressed. Probably
the most famous substance dualist was Descartes. The Cartesian form of substance dualism is
like the Platonic form in that the self is the soul or mind which possesses a body. Recall that
Descartes could come to this conclusion by doubting everything he formerly knew, but he was
not able to doubt that he was a thinking thing. His body could be doubted as an illusion of the
mind, but his mind per se could not be doubted. The instant he thought of himself in any way, he
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knew he must logically exist. “I am, however, a real thing and really exist; [sic] but what thing? I
have answered: a thing which thinks.”92 Similarly, Descartes reasoned that, even if he were being
deceived by some malevolent demon, he must exist to be deceived in the first place.93
While Descartes was confident in his ability to doubt the reality of the body, Aquinas in
his Aristotelean fashion was not so confident due to an important difference in their concepts of
the soul. Descartes viewed the soul as the entirety of the self which probably possessed a body in
life, provided it was not being deceived by a malevolent demon. Aquinas, as has been discussed,
viewed the soul as the substantial form of the body, or the essence of the body. “The essence of a
thing is that which makes it the sort of thing it is.”94 Aquinas asserted the soul was the animating
life force, “the act of [the] body.”95 The word “act” here is short for “actuality,” which contrasts
with “potentiality.” A body may be potentially alive or not, so a living body is one actualized or
animated by its form, i.e., its soul.96
Similarly, in line with Aristotle, Aquinas considered the soul to be the form of the body
like the seal is to the wax.97 Aquinas’ view of the soul is more intimately related to the body,
including the brain, in its causal interactions with the body. The body is not just some vehicle the

92

Descartes, Meditations, 10.

93

Ibid., 9.

94

Feser, Aquinas, 31.

95

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Benziger Bros.,
1947), Ia, q. 75, art 1, https://www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/FP.html.
96

Feser, “Aquinas on the Human Soul,” Substance Dualism, 133.

See section “8. Body and Soul.” John O’Callaghan, “Saint Thomas Aquinas,” Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, 2014, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/.
97

35

soul controls, it is a necessary component to the human as a complete and living creature. As has
been mentioned already, a human without a body is severely deprived.
Feser sees another important difference on the essential soul between Descartes and
Aquinas. Descartes placed heavy importance on “thinking as the essence of the soul,” but that
implies that any amount of a person’s life wherein she is incapable of having actual thoughts
excludes the presence of a soul. This is a sobering possibility for those in utero, early postpartem infancy, or even a vegetative state. In contrast, Aquinas would assert that a living body
necessarily meant the body was ensouled as the soul is the animating force of the body.98
Although, it is worth granting that Descartes’ emphasis on self-reflection and thinking
principally assured him of his own existence. This emphasis does not mean humans incapable of
thought lack a soul, but that they lack the ability to ensure their own existence.99 This emphasis
also does not mean the lack of such assurance concludes an absence of soul. Simply put, a living
body is one animated by an essential soul and is fully human only when said soul enlivens the
body. In addition to Aquinas’ sophisticated view, some other experiences suggest compelling
evidence to believe that disembodied souls retain consciousness in the intermediate state
discussed earlier. Those experiences are near-death experiences.
Near-death experiences (NDEs) have a mixed reception. For those already believing, they
are an encouraging sign of confirmation for the hopes already held. For those already skeptical or
doubting, they are yet another unreliable phenomenon caused perhaps by hallucinations or final
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brain-states trying to cope with the experience of dying.100 After a patient experienced an NDE,
Melvin Morse began investigating the phenomenon. His studies took him from Raymond Moody
to developing a genuine interest in understanding more so that his colleagues could speak with
patients about death more openly and knowledgeably.101 Morse’s research was intentionally and
carefully crafted to avoid leading the patient or subtly skewing results. Habermas and Moreland
discuss several other medical professionals to have taken up Moody’s challenge to research the
subject more objectively, and the reports and evidence for the phenomena is significant.
However, extensive coverage of these medical studies on NDEs is outside the scope of this
thesis.102
There are those among theists who would also draw a critical conclusion to NDEs.
Geisler questions whether reports of NDEs really constitute the biblical definition of “death,”
i.e., that the soul left the body.103 Geisler reasons that a soul that leaves and returns to the body is
a resurrection which conflicts with the Christian teachings on one general resurrection for all at
the end. On his definition, if the wide reports of NDEs were true, it would mean resurrections
were happening frequently. Geisler also cites Scripture to indicate people only die once (Heb.
9:27).
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Habermas and Moreland respond to these challenges by asserting that there are two kinds
of death: clinical death, which is reversable, and biological death, which is final.104 NDEs are
cases of clinical death, not the final biological death. Therefore, clinical death, which may be
reversed, is only a “near” death experience where “death” implies biological death. Similarly, the
passage Hebrews could be referring to a general rule rather than a hard restriction. Several
people throughout Scripture other than Jesus were reported to have been raised from the dead (1
Kings 17:17-24; 2 Kings 4:18-37; 13: 20-21; Luke 7:11-17; 8: 40-56; Matt. 27:50-53; John 11;
Acts 9:36-43; 20: 7-12). Geisler is right to be guarded, though. These reports do not confirm
much about the afterlife and should not be taken as sources of theology, but even if they are
deceptions on par with Descartes’ malevolent demon or legitimate experiences, it reveals there is
some form of post-mortem consciousness and evidence of an intermediate state.
Much has been said about immortality to this point, and much more could be said, but
enough has been covered to propose the expectations for immortality that will be used for the
remainder of this thesis before turning to mind uploading specifically.
Expectations for Actual Immortality
The following expectations have been extracted from the content covered so far.
Reflecting on why an individual might be seeking immortality, the fear of death and possible
oblivion is a strong motivator. At the heart of this desire, though, is a desire for the individual
person to persist and not be annihilated. If people were certain of what happens after death, it
would not likely carry the same power of fear. In fact, this lack of fear of death is a probable
outcome for people who have experienced NDEs. The concern that people disappear at death is
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an old one. Even considering the burial practices and ceremonies of the ancient world, there still
lingered a “fear that when [the soul] has left the body [its] place may be nowhere, and that on
that very day of death [it] may perish and come to an end.”105
The most important expectation for actual immortality then should be that the first-person
referent (FPR), the subject being referenced during introspection, must exist indefinitely.
Moreland and Craig note how an FPR’s consciousness exhibits what is called “point-of-view
subjectivity,” and highlight two noteworthy things about it. First, “for any conscious state
whatsoever, it belongs to a subject of experience,” and “the idea of a subjectless conscious
state… is just ridiculous.” Second, “conscious states are always features of a subjective point of
view [which] characterize [the subject’s] unique and distinct standing point in the world.”106
It is not enough for memories or psychological details to carry on alone; if a person loses
his memories and all past and present knowledge of himself, he still has the same FPR who
experiences this loss of psychological identity. The subject of memory loss is the same subject
who had the memories initially. Additionally, if he were being tortured or pampered in this
ignorant state, the same FPR would still experience those things while being ignorant of his past.
Further, to even make sense of the thought experiment that the person had memories, lost
memories, then wondered about the loss logically means a continuing personal identity to have
such experiences. The FPR must be identical through these experiences.
Following the reasoning for preserved responsibility of one’s actions in life, the
ontological history of the FPR must be diachronically identical in the immortal state as in the
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living state. This should ensure that the immortal person is equally responsible for her actions
after gaining immortality as she would be prior to immortality. Related to an unbroken
ontological history is an identical count of FPRs that might refer to memories held of previous
life events. This will account for the indivisibility of the soul and closely relates to the single
ontological history of the FPR.
The final picture of immortality then is a persisting FPR that is singular in ontological
history and total count of referents who endures indefinitely into the future. Despite having ruled
out some modes of immortality already, this definition would allow for astral or immaterial,
immortal soul models of immortality to qualify. It is intended to be graciously considerate while
still attaining the apparent objectives of gaining immortality, and it should suffice for the
remainder of the thesis.
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Chapter 3
Mind Uploading and Metaphysics
In this chapter, the reasons for why mind uploading fails as a means of immortality will
be explained. The concept of mind uploading has already been briefly mentioned, but further
analysis is required to consider both the nuances of mind uploading and the metaphysical
implications. This chapter will provide that elaboration of meaning and intent. Next, mind
uploading will be discussed and analyzed to establish expectations for actual immortality in the
context of mind uploading. It will become apparent how some of the already-discussed thought
experiments will contribute to the conversation in the section covering the proposed mind
uploading methods. Finally, having explored those methods and noting where the thought
experiments parallel the methods, some concluding metaphysical questions will be addressed
regarding the nature of being an uploaded mind and, most important to the topic of immortality,
the nature of identity in the context of mind uploading.
Before defining mind uploading, briefly consider the following mind uploading terms.
“Substrate” describes a physical grounding for consciousness, like a biological brain or a
synthetic artifact housing the uploaded mind. A computerized brain is a brain or substrate that
mimics the functionality of the organic brain but is constructed by small devices like nanobots or
a larger computer may be simulating or emulating the brain. A computer emulation is then
considered a “virtual” brain, as opposed to a nanobot brain, which is a physical brain. The terms
“synthetic” and “artificial” will be used synonymously to contrast a “biological” brain. Other
terms will be introduced when appropriate. An excellent source for more in-depth definitions can
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be found in Keith Wiley’s Glossary.107 So, starting at the beginning, what is mind uploading and
what does it mean?
What is Mind Uploading?
Definitions for mind uploading vary greatly, which might be due to the ambiguity with
which the mind/brain distinction is handled. The transferal of the FPR is difficult to attain, if
even possible, when the mind/brain distinction is vague. Consequently, this chapter will only be
able to cover the available concepts regarding minds, brains, and mind uploading. A simple
definition with modest objectives is “a process of transfer of a mind from a biological brain to
another substrate.”108 Koene here is using the term “mind” as distinct from “brain.” The entire
chapter deals with “substrate-independent minds,” and Koene is considering how one’s mind
could exist apart from one’s original biological brain. A better term to replace “mind” in Koene’s
definition might be “consciousness” to indicate what would be transferred.
Also, Koene’s definition does not mean that he is metaphysically inclined towards the
mind being immaterial. Like many other transhumanists, Koene treats the mind as an emergent
feature of one’s material substrate, i.e., the brain. “The mind continues to depend on a substrate
to exist and to operate, but there are substrate choices.”109 Just as a smiley face can be drawn in
sand, condensation, or a film of dust, the material is less important than the pattern instantiated
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from it.110 Thus, Koene believes a physical substrate can be a biological brain or a synthetic
machine operating identically to a brain, and the mind emerges from the substrate.
One of the better definitions that captures the goals for immortality outlined in the
previous chapter is “the transfer of a human mind, memories, personality, and ‘self’ to a new
high-performance substrate,” which the author describes as “the ultimate technology for
immortality” and “the ‘holy grail’ of transhumanism.”111 Both Prisco and Koene treat the mind
as an emergent feature of the brain, and properties like “memories, personality, and ‘self’” are
the features that construct one’s personal identity and consciousness.112 Even though these
definitions come from emergentists, they do not rule out dualist views of the mind.
The expression “upload” is also somewhat vague. In modern information technology
vernacular, the word implies a copying of the digital contents from a source to a target location.
If any programs “move” a file from source to target, there is an implicit step included to delete
the source after the target has completed its upload. In modern computer terms, the “Cut”
command moves a file from one location to another, while the “Copy” command duplicates it to
a new location. Mind uploading that meets the criteria for immortality defined in chapter two
would be closest to a “Cut” command. When uploading files between computers, though,
uploading does not strictly mean to transfer, i.e., “Cut,” it means to “Copy.” Therefore, the term
“upload” is vague and unclear.
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Therefore, some have chosen different terms to better represent the action being
performed. For example, Keith Wiley prefers the term “mind splitting” to “mind uploading”
because it better reflects his expectations of the process. Similarly, Michael Cerullo uses the term
“branching” synonymously with “splitting.”113 To clarify his view, Wiley uses the terms “type”
and “token” when describing mind splitting. Types are universal properties that group like
things, “e.g., red things, sharp things;” a token is a “spatio-temporal occurrence of a type,” or a
“particular” instance of that type.114 Given those terms, Wiley describes mind splitting
accordingly: “where once there was a single occurrence of a mind-state type, there are now two
occurrences of the same mind-state type, along with two tokens of the corresponding brain-state
type… To be precise, splitting is a two-step process, both doubling and divergence.”115 For
Wiley, both brain-states and mind-states are types which are instantiated as tokens in a person. If
the person uploads, or splits, there are duplicate brain-state tokens for that person’s biological
brain and duplicate mind-state tokens for that person’s mental states, both based on their
respective types corresponding to that person. The divergence Wiley notes is when either mind
begins experiencing different events from each other “at the next dynamic moment.”116
Wiley discusses elsewhere his metaphysical inclination to Platonism. “I prefer the
Platonic approach, that universals exist independent of any association, requiring neither
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physical instance nor conscious recognition in order to exist.”117 Wiley’s view demonstrates the
failure of mind uploading, specifically the branching and forking variations, as a means of
immortality in that it does not preserve the FPR. The act of divergence immediately disqualifies
it because the source mind being uploaded is merely undergoing the “Copy” command and not
persevering indefinitely into the future as it may when using the “Cut” command. While these
alternative terms are helpful to better describe what authors are talking about regarding the
procedure, any form of uploading which parallels branching or forking cannot meet the defined
criteria for immortality. Moving forward, the term “upload” will not be treated synonymously
with branching and forking when discussing immortality.
Some metaphysical details must be considered as well. Consciousness has been a
complicated matter for materialists. Some like Wiley reluctantly accept metaphysical
components which they would not otherwise consider absent the puzzle of consciousness. Wiley
admits he “came to metaphysics reluctantly,” by which he means that he was reluctant to broach
the topic of metaphysics in his studies, but it was required for him to work out his view.118 Most
important to Wiley’s metaphysical views is the idea that the mind is an emergent feature of a
sufficiently-complex brain, an idea he handles almost axiomatically. “The coordinated behavior
of the brain might simply be consciousness.”119 He uses flocking birds as an analogy of how
interactions within complex physical systems may cause shapes or patterns to emerge. Others
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have pointed to emergentism as being the most common modern explanation for consciousness
among “highly complex systems” like the human mind.120
Not all emergent views require a commitment to something as exotic as abstract Platonic
objects, though. In what has become characteristic of Kurzweil’s cleverness and creativity,
Kurzweil proposes a form of materialism related to emergentism that he terms “patternism,”
because patterns describe a more intelligent instance of the otherwise “dumb” material which
lacks the order of patterns. “It’s through the emergent powers of the pattern that we transcend…
The pattern is far more important than the material stuff that constitutes it.”121 Kurzweil
compares the random strokes of paint on a canvas as simple material, but when the material
forms patterns, “they transcend the material stuff and become art.” Similarly, noises and sounds
are materials of a sort, but when they are ordered sufficiently into patterns, they become music.
Extending this analogy further, human consciousness emerges in ordered patterns from the
otherwise material brain. The order which causes the emergent patterns, like the flocking birds,
is a “natural” result of the complex system interacting with its neighboring parts and responding
accordingly.
Kurzweil’s patternist explanation maintains that the emergent pattern is still only
material; “we don’t need to go beyond the capabilities of patterns of matter and energy to
account for the capabilities of human intelligence.”122 To be clear, Kurzweil views consciousness
as information, not strictly the material, like the river is not strictly the water composing it at any
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given moment. The consciousness has a pattern to it like the shape of the river, and that tends to
change slowly over time. So, Kurzweil’s brand of materialism is a bit less “material,” so to
speak, but he still views the material world of physics, matter, and energy as the only existing
substance.
Materialism holds no consensus, though. Modern property dualists, or epiphenomenalists,
and even “type-E dualists” by David Chalmer’s taxonomy, hold that the mental or phenomenal
states are real and more than just material; Chalmers does claim, though, that epiphenomenalism
is compatible with substance dualism but maintains that the causation is a one-way relationship.
“Physical states cause phenomenal states, but the converse is not true.”123 Chalmers treats the
issue of consciousness as persistently open-ended and perhaps one of the most difficult things
that we do not understand, a problem he describes as “baffling” given that subjective
consciousness is the most intimate thing a person can know.124 Materialism, property dualism,
and substance dualism were addressed in the previous chapter, so critiquing or evaluating them
here will not be necessary, but it is valuable to be aware of related metaphysical concepts while
considering immortality in the context of mind uploading.
Given the expectations for actual immortality outlined at the end of the previous chapter,
those same criteria will be used as the standard in this mind uploading context. The three criteria
defined for actual immortality were a single FPR, an identical ontological history, and an
identical count of FPRs after the procedure as was before. Notice that these criteria focus on
ontological details rather than epistemological ones; for true immortality to succeed, it is not
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enough to think one’s self is the same the remembered self. Objective success of immortality
requires the enduring personal identity to match the person who initiated the immortalizing
process. In mind uploading, this means any successfully uploaded minds, where “success”
should include the presence of an active consciousness, must possess introspective powers where
the referent of the first-person is identical to the source mind prior to the procedure. The upload
must share an identical ontological history with the source mind as well. This means the
uploaded mind may not be created in the process of the upload, it must be transferred from the
source substrate to the target substrate, i.e., it must perform the “Cut” command. In the same
way, no upload where multiple minds are the product of the procedure may count as a successful
immortalizing of the FPR as each duplicate would possess its own FPR under the best
conditions. These would be the branching or forking scenarios ruled out earlier.
Given the wide range of definitions, it is easy to see how many scenarios do not meet the
needs of immortality outlined above. Although not all mind uploading methods should be
excluded; what methods are being considered to implement such a Gilgameshian goal?
How Might Mind Uploading Work?
The question of methodology will be drawn largely from Wiley’s taxonomical work. He
offers the disclaimer that his writing generally assumes that the neuron is the “structural and
functional” level of the brain that must be modeled for these methods.125 This contrasts with
smaller, more granular levels, or conversely, larger, more regional levels of the brain. Earlier in
his writing, Wiley asserts that researchers must all simply pick some level of the brain’s
composition beneath which the underlying functionality and nuances are treated as a black box.
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The measure, according to Wiley, for determining this black-box threshold is where the
designated details are “intrinsically irrelevant to the larger model” (emphasis Wiley’s).126 This
may be an appropriate guideline, but it is hard not to see the metaphysical implications already
being presented. Wiley, and many mind-uploading advocates, view the brain through the lens of
functionalism, i.e., the view that mental states are describable based on their functionality of
receiving input and performing output.
For another example, Martine Rothblatt writes that the goal of AI and Turing Testing,
which will be discussed more later, is to “replicate the functionality of a specific human
consciousness in software.”127 Rothblatt’s clear focus on replication of functionality reveals a
popular view that consciousness and the mind can be viewed through the lens of functionalism.
Using the Terasem model of Turing Testing, AI is measured “as good as, or equivalent to, or a
continuation or analog of, the original biological consciousness.”128 The functionalist perspective
of mind uploading is really nothing more than emulation and simulation, which may work from a
third-party perspective, but the implications on the survival of the individual are.
Related to functionalism, two more pairs of definitions should be provided briefly before
continuing.129 One was hinted at in Wiley’s statement regarding the “structural” and the
“functional.” Replication of the structure means the brain’s composition and neurophysiology is
recreated accurately. Functional replication is where the functions of the lowest replicated level,
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e.g., the neuron, are replicated regarding the data input and the behavioral output. The other pair
is with regards to the upload processes side-effects on the source brain itself. Any process where
the source brain remains in-tact is a non-destructive upload. Conversely, if the process destroys
the source brain, it is a destructive upload. Each of the following methods can be destructive or
non-destructive depending on what is being proposed. Wiley went into great depth, covering
practically every variation on the following methods, so only a high-level survey of his work will
be provided here.130
Gradual Replacement
The first method being considered is called Gradual Replacement. In this process,
nanobots attach to each neuron and analyze the input and output of the neuron. The result is a
computerized brain. Depending on the objective, the nanobots may non-destructively remain
along-side the neurons for some period, but eventually, the objective for the computerized brain
would be for the nanobot to destructively replace the neuron, effectively killing it and resuming
its functions. The full range of replacement options have been considered, replacing neurons
immediately at some designated rate of neurons/second to “neuron-batches.”131 Given the
computerized brain could hypothetically reside alongside the biological brain, this creates
scenarios called “brain-doubling.”132
The brain-doubling scenario clearly fails to meet the criteria for immortal. On a best-case
scenario where the computerized brain possesses personal identity and consciousness, this would
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constitute two identities simultaneously which violates all three criteria outlined for immortality.
Two consciousnesses possess separate FPRs, so the “I” referent cannot be the same for the two
persons. The uploaded consciousness would also be new, even if it possessed the memories from
the source mind; contra Locke and the psychological criterion for personal identity, having
memories of past life events is not enough to constitute sameness of personal identity. This new
person would possess its own ontological beginning gained during the construction of the
artificial brain. It is not clear at what point of the artificial brain’s construction when the
consciousness would be bound to the brain, even from materialistic or property dualist positions.
Additionally, and most obviously, the identity count would have incremented from one to two.
No person’s self can belong to any other person.
Given the piece-by-piece nature of gradual replacement, the Ship of Theseus may come
to mind. Also provided the complications discussed in the previous chapter with artifacts not
being able to hold a strict sense of identity, it is difficult to see how gradual brain replacement
would be different from gradual plank replacement, especially on a materialistic metaphysic or a
body criterion for personal identity. One possible explanation would likely be an appeal to
emergent consciousness. As the neurons would be replaced one at a time, the physical structure
would be roughly the same regarding complex material interactions and functionality. If
emergentism is accurate, the pattern of consciousness emerging from the brain, part biological,
part artificial, would still emerge.
One point of identity covered by Moreland and Craig already is important to recall here.
“Since temporal (and spatial) parts are essential to physical artifacts… it follows that a specific
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artifact could not have had a different temporal origin and still be the same object….”133 This
strains the case for a gradually-replaced brain for the materialist since the brain is the physical
object taken to be the source of personhood. If people are their brains, given the artificial brain
cannot be identified with the previous brain, it is clearly not the same person. Personhood and
identity must come from something more than the mere material brain. Similarly, the emergent
mind is dependent upon its material for its being, i.e., for the pattern generation that defines it.
Still, regardless of the obstacles mentioned, Gradual Replacement is viewed by many to
be a preferrable route as it offers a more seamless process than its alternatives. Anders Sandberg
thinks this approach might settle people’s concerns regarding the preservation of their
consciousness and personal identity since there is not a distinct separation between source and
uploaded minds, though he admits it is not universally held as the best solution to that problem;
Sandberg cites that John Searle suspects the source mind could instead gradually lose
consciousness as more of the replacement occurs.134 So Gradual Replacement offers some
prospects for maintaining personal identity, i.e., the same FPR. What other the other methods?
Scan-and-duplicate
Following the Gradual Replacement procedure is the scan-and-duplicate procedure.
Rather than replace the biological brain one neuron at a time, the brain is scanned to image and
map its structure so that it can be replicated physically or virtually.135 Again, Wiley provides a
granular taxonomy of scan-and-duplicate methods. Supposedly the most attainable in the soonest
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time frame, the “frozen scan-and-copy procedures” use a “frozen and static” brain as the source
of the upload and produce the upload from whatever state the brain is in at the time it was
frozen.136 These can be destructive or non-destructive, but, according to Wiley, the frozen
destructive method appears the most attainable currently.137 Wiley also attempts to describe what
this might perceptually be like for the uploaded mind’s perspective, namely, what the experience
of being uploaded must be like. In the “frozen non-destructive scan-and-copy” scenario, Wiley
also touches on the most relevant detail of mind uploading regarding immortality: “this
procedure permits the original brain and mind to awaken after the procedure, which has the
dramatic implications on assignment of identity.”138
It is difficult to see how a frozen brain being scanned, however precise the scanning may
be, could be considered a form of immortality. On a strictly materialistic view, there is no way
the scanned brain could produce an uploaded, emergent mind identical to the one who had died.
Ironically, substance dualism is required, i.e., the soul, for any upload that is scanned from death
to produce an identical mind. An enduring soul must somehow exist and be relinked to the
matching pattern of consciousness. From the first-person point of view, it is not clear what would
anchor a person’s identity between death and the first moment of uploaded life apart from a soul.
Memory would be the closest next option, but memory was ruled out as an option in the previous
chapter. On physicalism, emergent consciousness is a direct result of its underlying substrate.
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There is no enduring substance like the mind or soul to persist beyond death. Hence, any
uploaded mind based on a deceased, frozen brain could not be an identical FPR.
Each variation of mind uploading where the original or source mind is allowed to persist
presents the glaring question of identity. Rather than some of the scenarios listed in the previous
chapter on identity, i.e., the tyrant illustrations, the mind puzzles focus instead on the duplicity of
identities rather than the switching of identities. The brain-split thought experiments are very
similar though. If a person uploads their mind and survives the experience, it seems clear this
cannot be considered a form of immortality from the first-person perspective. Kurzweil
illustrates this when he quips of his response to the morning after an upload procedure, “‘Good
news, Ray, we’ve successfully reinstantiated you into a more durable substrate so we won’t be
needing your old body and brain anymore,’ I may beg to differ.”139
Swinburne’s point on no other consciousnesses being identifiable with his own other than
the one he possesses is applicable here.140 Even if all memories, skills, and mannerisms have
been replicated in the upload, and even if the uploaded mind possesses an actual consciousness,
it still cannot be identical with the source mind’s consciousness, its FPR. The “self” reference is
never identical when duplication is involved, even if the upload’s FPR appears to match the
memories that were uploaded or copied. Something of the source mind must be moved, not just
copied, from the original substrate to the new substrate for the FPR to have a chance of being
identical. All scenarios where the upload produces more than one FPR fail to meet the proposed
criteria for immortality. More than one FPR also means the resulting FPR is not identical to the
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source mind’s FPR. This is most apparent when one considers what it would be like for a single
FPR to still refer to the same “I” from multiple consciousnesses. It is an incoherent idea.
To Wiley’s point, his metaphysical view is that the upload is a split rather than a copy.
He grants that a copying is occurring, namely the copying of the token, i.e., the brain, but the
mind type itself is not being copied or duplicated, it is just being reinstantiated as the upload.141
Even if it is granted that a person is a type that can be reinstantiated infinitely, this is not the
same as attaining immortality. The original instance is left behind, so to speak. The upload may
behave and think the same as the original, but it cannot be the same FPR, and preservation of the
FPR indefinitely is the entire purpose of immortality. Despite all that can be granted for the scanand-duplicate method, it also does not meet the criteria for immortality.
Brain Division Scenario
The final approach, the Brain Division Scenario, is a variation on the split-brain thought
experiments.142 Wiley begins with the 50% split version where two brains are made from one,
both being half biological and half computerized. The computerized portions of the brain are
presumably following the same structural composition. Any number of variations on what
percentage is computerized verses biological can be proposed, but in the 50% split, it is not so
easy to assign what Wiley calls “primacy” of the original mind.143 He even asserts that “even
from the internal subjective perspective of the various resulting minds, there is no way to tell
who is who [sic].”144 This ladder assertion is perhaps assuming too much. To begin, it is not clear
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what differences in qualia, if any, there will be in possessing a partly computerize brain. Will the
common sensations of seeing colors or hearing sounds be the same with a computerized brain?
Will those experiences be the same as when the brain is fully biological or is there distinct qualia
for being a partly computerized brain? Additionally, if the upload possesses significant bodily or
mental upgrades as transhumanists intend, it is reasonable to suspect a radically different brain or
body will feel different from the original biological body, but even this, like Wiley’s
expectations, is only conjecture.
Wiley offers a thought-provoking question for those who would assign primacy of
identity to any brain divisions that hold most of the original brain. What is the threshold for
assigning some division of brain primacy of identity?145 While it is tempting to suggest that 51%
or greater is the original mind, it is not clear if primacy of identity can be granted to either mind
after the split. One possible conclusion, following Moreland and Craig, is that the original person
prior to the split has died and two new persons are made from the procedure; another conclusion
is that the original person will be identical to either of the uploads. 146 Inherent in these questions
is the following question: assuming substance dualism is correct, and the soul is the self which
asserts its will over the body through the brain, how much of, or which parts of the brain are
necessary for a mind to continue to successfully assert its will over its corresponding body?
How does the mind assert its will over the body through the brain? Does the brain act as
some receiver that respects only a particular “pattern” of will asserted by a particular mind, a
kind of emergent mounting point for the will? If so, does this mounting point duplicate if the
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brain states are successfully duplicated and behave in the same way as the original brain? While
this emergent mounting point for the will provides minimal explanation for the connection
between the mind and body, it only pushes the question back a step. The phenomenon of
intentional will over the physical body is elusive, but the initial question remains regarding how
much of one’s brain must be present for the mind to assert its will over the body. Similarly, if the
brain is split by some percentage into some number of additional brains as the Brain Division
Scenario proposes, which brain and body will the mind assert its will over? It is easy to see how
concluding that the division of the original brain caused the original mind to become
disembodied, i.e., die, independent of whether the new brains were successfully linked by some
phenomenological means.
One final point of critique on the Brain Division Scenario is that it is not clear how this
option is preferrable to the Gradual Replacement method. Wiley even admits they are the same
in some variations.147 In the long-term, it would appear this only pushes back the goal of
avoiding death, especially in cases where the biological brain is in the majority. The same
problems that vex the whole biological brain, disease, aging, and decay, are all still present in
this scenario, so immortality has not really been attained since the life expectancy is not extended
limitlessly. Additionally, given the ambiguity regarding whether either of the resulting minds can
be identified with the original, it is, at best, inconclusive. At worst, it is a negative result that the
FPR has been preserved during the Brain Division Scenario. Each proposed uploading method
transforms the human brain radically in the efforts to imbue the person with everlasting life,
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freeing it from death. That is the transhumanist objective, but what happens if that goal is
achieved? What becomes of the person then?
“Would I Still Be Human?” – Post Humanism and Artificial Intelligence
The question of whether the uploaded person would be human is a complex but important
one. The issue of what it means to be human is not new. Modern definitions may point to a
scientific taxonomy, e.g., homo sapiens. Older definitions like those from Aquinas, and by
extension, Aristotle, instead define humans are rational souls, i.e., animal souls with the power of
intellect and intentionality.148 Many other potential definitions and essential properties exist;
defining humanity with great resolution is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead of striving for
an acceptable explanation for what it means to be human, it may be more expedient to follow
Nick Bostrom’s lead and instead define what must be transcended to be considered posthuman.
Bostrom outlines three human capacities that must be transcended to be qualified as a
“posthuman capacity:” health span, cognition, and emotion.149 Health span, or lifespan, is most
pertinent for this thesis, but transcendent cognition and emotion will be briefly discussed.
A transcendent cognition means one’s cognitive and mental abilities are significantly
enhanced beyond the average human’s capacity. “Memory, deductive, and analogic reasoning,
and attention” are some Bostrom lists. This is already happening to some degree with the
prevalence of smart phones and devices integrated into so many people’s lives. Rather than find
a hard copy encyclopedia to find information on some topic, modern inquirers pull out their
pocket computers or use voice-activated assistants to query a vast network of worldwide
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knowledge. Modern humans in contrast to humans 30 years ago are already well on their way to
transcending the natural cognitive capacities. The greatest latency that is yet to be removed is the
time it takes for a person to pull out her phone and type in the question or speak to her voice AI.
Should technologies like Elon Musk’s Neuralink become approved and refined enough for
commercial use, that latency will disappear, and computer use will be a thought away.150
Similarly, emotional capacities like joy, anger, sadness, loneliness, etc., are within the
realm of capacities which may be transcended, Bostrom thinks. He admits conceptualizing what
transcendent emotion looks like may be difficult, but he notes it is not surprising how difficult it
is given the range of novel emotions that might come with a posthuman existence.151 The most
attainable examples might be how technology could help fight depression and thoughts of
suicide by helping maintain a balanced brain chemistry. In short, any emotional state that a
posthuman could plausibly attain would be one which is impossible by human efforts unaided by
technology or medicine.
As was mentioned, a health span or lifespan that significantly exceeds human health and
life expectancy qualifies as being posthuman, and certainly mind uploading meets that standard.
The limits would be available data, regularly maintaining software updates, and the underlying
hardware quality, as mentioned by Kurzweil in the previous chapter.152 It is important to note
that not all posthuman forms of extended lifespans are identical to immortality. Michael Rose
suggests people at the end of the current century will still be susceptible to “aging-related
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diseases” and other forms of “[accidental death], homicide, suicide, or infection.”153 Similarly,
Russell Bjork lists three categories of death after stating the same point that most technological
solutions to death “do not offer any possibility of being a reliable total solution to death and none
offers such a possibility for all people.”154 Bjork’s list includes natural death, e.g., aging, disease,
etc., accidental death, and intentional death, either by others or self, homicide or suicide,
respectively. Bjork and Rose agree on both the range of deaths.
Transcending human limitations by merging with machines is the essence of Kurzweil’s
famous term, “The Singularity.” In what Kurzweil labels “Epoch Five,” of which there are six,
human-machine hybrids will transcend human limitations and grow at an unstoppable rate.155
This merging with machines, the Singularity, would be the dawn of a new kind of intelligence. In
many scenarios where posthumanity would be reached, it becomes a distinctly new species. This
is the transhumanist goal, to use technology to guide the evolution of humans. Some disagree
that such a leap would still qualify as being human, hence “post-” human. Robert Harle asserts
“the new entity will cease to be human, and [Harle] contends it will not be the next step in
human evolution but the creation of a new species, which may or may not treat the other species
with intrinsic worth.”156
Some have gone so far as to already deify the transcendent posthuman entities. In
Dinello’s eloquence, humans are to “become electronic gods who have downloaded their minds
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into robotic technology and cast off their diseased bodies, cyber-existing forever in a virtual
reality of disembodied perfection and simulated bliss.”157 Similarly, Harari entitles his book
Homo Deus as a focus on how humans will be upgraded “into gods, and turn Homo sapiens into
Homo deus.”158 However, Harari suggests the transformation will be a steady one, upgrading in
steps, until the era of posthumans reflect upon who their ancestors were and realize they are no
longer the same kind of people.159 To clarify, these techno-deities are god-like in a Greco-Roman
sense; morally imperfect, finite-but-powerful individuals who have some beginning and are
dependent other external efficient causes.
Kurzweil’s “Singularitarians,” his term for posthumans who have merged with machines
via uploading, take things a step further. Rather than steadily transforming with technology over
time, posthumans upload their consciousness and copyable brain-state and perhaps mental-state
to software programs capable of supporting such complexity. This becomes the first true
artificial general intelligence (AGI). The popular conception of AI and the modern instances of
AI are not identical. Modern AI that exists in smart devices everywhere and govern complex
Google searches, and govern driverless cars are all what are called “narrow AI.”160 These narrow
AIs are exceptionally good at learning a particular thing deeply provided the right training. If the
IBM Deep Blue AI, which was the first computer to beat the world chess champion in 1997,
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were installed to drive a car or even win a game of checkers, it would fail.161 AGI in Kurzweil’s
vision would be provided with everything the AI would need to “know” what it is like to be
human instead of needing to learn how to be human through many iterations of testing and
training. Humans merging with machines may be the closest that AGI comes to reality.
Kurzweil’s Singularity and the posthumans that emerge from it possess a quasi-divine
role in Kurzweil’s expectations. Kurzweil is a sort of pantheist, though it might be more
appropriate to term it “dumb pantheism,” as he clarifies he both views the universe to be “God,”
in a sense, due to the universe being the greatest phenomenon science is aware of, but also that
this “universe is not conscious – yet.”162 The greatest thing Kurzweil can conceive of, the
universe, is loosely what he considers to be God, and it will be the waking of matter into
consciousness that brings “God” to awareness; this is Kurzweil’s Sixth Epoch.163 “So in a sense,
we can say that the Singularity will ultimately infuse the universe with spirit.”164 Ronald ColeTurner agrees that Kurzweil views posthumans as quasi-divine while noting the centrality of the
Singularity in Kurzweil’s view of posthumans. “Kurzweil almost seems to say that the pathway
to transhumanism is through the singularity.”165
Additionally, a contested topic within this realm of mind uploading and AI development
is the question of one’s body. How necessary is a body for mimicking the “human” experience?
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It has already been answered whether the posthuman is still human or not, so why should it
matter if the posthuman continues to have a humanesque experience? Given Socrates’, and
perhaps by extension, Plato’s, emphasis on the importance of death freeing the person from the
body so that the admirable pursuits of philosophy, wisdom, and knowledge may be gained
without distraction, disembodiment on such a view is preferrable. This would be compatible with
virtual mind uploads. Similarly, the Cartesian perspective of mind and body may compatibly
allow such a disembodied existence, for that was what Descartes was questioning in the first
place. The virtual mind, were it conscious, would still be able to ponder itself introspectively,
which should validate its existence like it did for Descartes.
Conversely, there are reasons to suspect embodiment is necessary. Victoria Lorrimar
cites several studies that indicate the importance of “embodied cognition,” and she also notes the
irony that AI researches “are turning emphatically toward the body in their work” (emphasis
Lorrimar’s).166 She suggests that the “mind as a computer” concept is part of the reason why
embodiment is so commonly neglected in the study of the mind.167 Lorrimar also touches on the
question of “adequate communication between embodied and nonembodied intelligence,” but
she warns of the “swampy territory of strong (AGI) verses weak (narrow) AI,” Turing Testing,
and the Chinese Room (parentheticals mine). Turing Testing and the Chinese Room will be
discussed further in the next section, but Lorrimar summarizes her argument at that point that,
whatever the AI is supposed to be, “it cannot really be a human mind, because human minds
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come in human bodies” (emphasis Lorrimar’s).168 For Lorrimar, the question of human vs
posthuman can be reduced to the sort of body the mind possesses.
An argument can be made loosely that virtual minds, AI, possess a sort of body, though
certainly not human. Apart from whatever hypothetical virtual body it may possess, it is
“embodied” within the computer setup that holds its massive simulation. Herzfeld describes
Deep Blue as “embodied in a bank of super computers. So, the question is not whether super
intelligence requires a physical body, but what kind of body.”169 Herzfeld also quotes Rodney
Brooks of MIT as having claimed that AI needs to experience the surprises of this world like we
do to mimic us successfully.170 This would certainly be the case for non-uploaded minds, but it is
uncertain how necessary a body might be for an uploaded mind. It stands to reason that even a
virtual body might be the minimum necessity for the uploaded mind to interact with whatever
virtual world it inhabits. Given the experience a mind would have in being an embodied human
up to the point of being uploaded, adjusting to a disembodied existence would seem a substantial
shock on top of the likely trauma of the upload in the first place. Bodily experiences and
sensation play an important role in how humans interact with most external realities, both
empirical and social.
One final question focuses on a subtle point Bjork touched on earlier. None of the
solutions offer something that necessarily would be available to all people. While some may
transcend to their posthuman status, other humans incapable of such transcendence will be stuck
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in their human lives. It is not hard to imagine billionaires like Bezos and Musk being the first to
access such technologies at their exorbitant costs. Costs for uploading would likely be
considerable and, certainly at the beginning, storage size at a premium. Would the attitudes of
the posthumans look down on and devalue the humans who were either unable or unwilling to
take this next step? The most human thing about posthumans may end up being how technology
is used as a weapon to mistreat and oppress others.
Pondering this same question, Ronald Green wonders, considering the last century of
human history and its large-scale malevolence and horrifying development of weapons like
nuclear weapons, how the technology would not “lead to horrors and cruelties on an
unprecedented and unimaginable scale.”171 Citing history to illustrate this point, Adam
Rutherford’s cautioning reminds readers that eugenics was viewed positively in the early 20thcentury and was a popular scientific topic. Rutherford notes how Harry Laughlin authored “a
‘Model Eugenical Sterilization Law’ to standardize state legislation to prevent people with
'undesirable' characteristics from having babies… It would eventually be translated and adopted
by the Third Reich.”172 Powerful people already do terrible things to “inferior” people. The
Holocaust of the Third Reich is just one example in history, let alone the last century. Why
would posthumans be any different upon transcending humans using rapid technological
advancement and enhancement?
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Consider what a Nietzschean posthuman might think or do with vastly transcendent
cognition and access to technology or proficiency which regular humans lack. Yunus Tuncel
notes how Nietzsche scoffed at the idea of immortality, not because he thought it impossible, but
because he did not think some people were worth keeping alive indefinitely, or “that most of us
are far too insignificant and worthless to deserve immortality.”173 Along this line of concern,
Benedikt Göcke voices concern that technology like what transhumanists are seeking should not
be researched and attained due to the inherent threat and potential of it being misused.174 Göcke
believes “transhumanism might lead to morally unacceptable social consequences” similar to the
plight of the 20th century.175 Göcke speculates, perhaps reasonably, that not all would be able to
afford technological enhancement and social inequality could be rampant.176
Also, considering the Nazi example of eugenics in the Holocaust, party support for social
oppression like that of the Nazi Party and the “policies of racial hygiene” developed in part by
Madison Grant is a historic reality.177 An objection may be that cultures have learned from their
mistakes could be made, but this would be a somewhat naïve claim for two reasons. First, the
current Chinese Communist Party appears to be exercising similar oppression tactics regarding
the Uyghur Muslim minority group, among others.178 Knowing history is different than learning
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from it. Second, the ethical problems of eugenics were a new topic during the early 20th-century
and had not been fully explored by the time Nazi Germany executed them. Posthuman
transcendence would be at least as novel as eugenics was during the early 20th-century, if not
more unique and revolutionary. If similar oppression were to occur of “lesser” humans at the
hands of “greater” posthumans, it may be the most human thing about posthumans.
This posthuman status would be the techno-immortality transhumanists have been
seeking for decades now. This immortality could be considered a mid-level immortality, not as
weak as immortality via memorialized legend, but not as strong as pseudo-godly immortality that
cannot be killed at all. An uploaded posthuman is still subject to the material degradation of her
new substrate. Any cataclysmic worldwide technological failure could threaten the integrity of
techno-immortality, but hopefuls like Kurzweil would likely suggest that, with the advance in
cognitive abilities, solutions would be proposed faster than threats would arise.
Beyond this posthuman techno-immortality is the question of what it means to be alive.
Can an uploaded mind akin to AGI be considered a living being? Can any AI be considered
“alive?” One position may be that the absence of life cannot be considered immortality, which is
certainly a position the transhumanist would maintain. An opposing position may be that only
consciousness of an enduring, immaterial is required for immortality, which would align with the
Platonic view of the immortal soul. In that case, the definition of life is irrelevant to immortality
so long as the soul’s consciousness is maintained, but even in a conscious post-mortem state,
disembodiment is still considered a state of death. It stands to reason that some form of
embodiment then must be a necessary qualifier for being considered alive. Reconsider also
Wright’s definition of immortality, a state in which death is impossible. Immortality coupled
with the condition of embodiment means any state in which disembodiment is possible would
67

not qualify as immortality. So, if embodiment is a condition for life and immortality, even in the
loose sense of being embodied within a super computer per Herzfeld, what might be said of the
hypothetical uploaded mind and how it relates to the antecedent source mind from which it was
derived?
“Would the Upload Still Be Me?” – Mind Uploading and Identity
Kurzweil asks this ultimate subjective ontological question considering a successful mind
upload, “is it really me?” and considers this as the most important question in mind uploading.179
Given the objective to prolong one’s own life indefinitely, i.e., immortality, centers on the FPR
enduring and being identical after the procedure to the FPR before the procedure, Kurzweil is
right in identifying this as the central question that must be answered in the affirmative for mind
uploading to be considered a successful means of immortality. How might this question be
answered? There are similarities between mind uploading and confirming AI. The Turing Test
was proposed by Alan Turing as a means of testing whether computers “think” in a way
indistinguishable from humans. Kurzweil himself is confident the first Turing Tests will be
passed by the late 2020s.180 This would then offer support for the idea of Turing Testing specific
uploaded people to assess the results of the mind upload.181 This expectation calls into question
the important distinction between being identical and only appearing identical.
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The Ontology and Epistemology of Uploaded Identity
Is a Turing Test sufficient to establish the identity of the uploaded mind? Unsurprisingly,
the opinions are mixed. While Kurzweil proposes uploaded minds can be tested to establish their
identity, others disagree. John Lennox, for example, disagrees with the notion that computers can
be conscious, be they uploaded or otherwise. “It is one thing to say that the brain functions in a
certain way like a computer. It is an entirely different thing to say that it is nothing but a
computer. Simulation is not duplication.”182 Lennox turns to Searle’s thought experiment, The
Chinese Room. In the thought experiment, Searle describes a man who does not speak Chinese
locked in a room with instructions on how to manipulate the characters. Chinese speakers then
pass in slips of paper under the door, which are questions in Chinese, and the man inside the
room, ignorant of the Chinese queries, answers the questions with the appropriate Chinese
symbols using a Chinese rule book. The people outside the room think the room can answer their
Chinese questions, but the man inside the room is merely blindly following rules for taking in
symbols and returning appropriate symbols per the provided guide. Searle’s point is clear and
echoes Lennox’s point. Functional intelligence is not the same thing as actual comprehension
and intelligence. This is partly why the term is “artificial” intelligence.
Lennox furthers his position, even if computers could demonstrate intelligence, i.e., they
could pass the Turing Test, Lennox would assert “that humans have something more than the
intelligence of the AI, no matter how advanced, will never have.”183 By this, Lennox is surely
inferring the possession of a human soul. His skepticism is grounded in the present reality that no
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program has come close to passing the Turing Test, but by Kurzweil’s predictions, there is still
just shy of a decade of progress to make.
As was mentioned earlier, this topic raises the issue of the ontological vs the
epistemological questions of identity. Moreland and Craig also emphasize the importance of
keeping distinct these types of questions so as not to confuse the conversation. The ontological
aspects, which they call the metaphysical aspects, focus on “what constitutes personal identity,”
whereas “the epistemological aspects focus on the criteria for a personal identity.”184 Recall in
the previous chapter the section on the “Criteria for Personal Identity,” and that it dealt with
epistemic questions of identity. The Turing Test also falls under this category for the upload and
the AGI. The reason it is epistemological is that almost all people asking the question are asking
from a third-party perspective and do so with fundamental uncertainty. “Fundamentally we
cannot penetrate the subjective experience of another entity with direct objective measurement,”
Kurzweil asserts.185 Consequently, it is from the subjective experience that the identity of
uploading must be answered, namely the subjective perspective of the source mind; any other
perspective will not be reliable enough.186
This restriction of authority is appropriate for the topic of immortality because it is the
subject himself who is striving to live on. While family and loved ones might be satisfied with a
Turing-passing simulation, he who yearns for immortality will be disappointed in the worse way.
This reveals a complication in the uploading methods already discussed: destructive uploading
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veils the success or failure of the uploading process. While non-destructive uploads can clearly
never be successful immortalizing processes given the source mind continues to live in his
original body, the destructive process leaves uncertainty regarding the success of the upload.
Even if the uploaded mind would perceive himself to be the same person as the source mind,
non-destructive processes would yield the same result, so mere belief in one’s identity is not a
guarantee for accurate perception of identity. Russell Blackford agrees with this line of
reasoning, citing Massimo Pigliucci, with whom he also agrees, that the uploaded identity would
be “no more than a psychological duplicate” and that the source mind in both the destructive and
non-destructive processes would “straightforwardly be the original person.”187
This may raise the question how the source mind knows it is the original as opposed to
one already uploaded and distinct from an older mind.188 One can imagine the confusion of an
original source mind, say Mind A, who uploads to produce Mind B. A series of uploads may
occur where B produced C, D, and E, then C produces F and G. If Mind C was not aware of his
status as an upload, he may think he is the original source mind rather than a subsequent source
mind. While this question can be just as puzzling, it is still largely an epistemic question. What
matters is the ontological existence of the mind which has a particular history to it. To answer the
ontological question, consider what a perfect observer would witness of the mind’s history. Was
the person birthed in a natural process of human gestation or did it originate by some uploading
process? This is the importance of the identical ontological history criterion for determining the
success of immortality; it breaks through any epistemological complications to focus on the
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objective reality of the mind and its history. So, proceeding forward, an ontological focus will be
maintained, and epistemological questions will only be considered when explicitly specified.
The Metaphysics of Uploaded Identity
What does it mean to refer to the self in an uploading context? The metaphysical
presuppositions must be considered to address what is meant in each case. Reasons have been
provided to reject materialism and property dualism in the previous chapter, but they will still be
consulted for the sake of understanding what is meant by self-identity. Kurzweil’s materialist
view is presented perhaps more stylistically than other materialists may, but he holds to his
patternist view; “patterns of information [are] the fundamental reality.”189 This is no surprise
given Kurzweil’s work in pattern recognition and the emphasis he places on developing a strong
neocortex.190 The self is an emergent feature that is able to think, feel, and experience. “The
pattern is far more important than the material stuff that constitutes it.”191 Similarly, Jonah
Goldwater considers the action of faxing documents as analogous to mind uploading. “If the
information in my brain is uploaded to a neural network or server, then I am uploaded only if I
am the information, rather than the object(s) it's stored in.”192 The information is transferred, not
the physical material. This aligns with Kurzweil’s patternist approach; the information pattern is
transferred, which is the self or the person on such views. In contrast to materialism where the
self is simply another animal higher on the food chain, at least this patternist view elevates the
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conscious self to something greater than its material, albeit still strictly dependent upon its
underlying material.
Wiley also takes a patternist approach to identity, though he refers to his view as a
restatement of pattern identity theory.193 He laments how quickly the position is branded as
“unspecified dualism” and prefers to “avoid dualistic labels entirely” because dualism is equally
disregarded by many, or at least many Wiley would like to have the attentions of.194 He takes a
Platonic approach to his use of types and tokens viewing them as abstract objects and
universals.195 Accordingly, the self is an emergent phenomenon, but in addition to being a
pattern of information strictly dependent upon underlying material, the mind is an abstract type
which may be instantiated multiple times provided the right brain token instance.196 Even with
this understanding of the self, each instance of a mind type would still be a distinct FPR, an
individual self. Wiley treats each subsequent mind split from the source mind as holding equal
primacy as the source itself. He does so because he rejects the metaphysical idea of copying a
mind. The new brain token would refer to the same mind type and begin experiencing its own
sequence of mind states branching from the original. Such a move is near to word play since the
question of identity requires a unique reference per Leibnitz’s Law. If the mind is a sharable
type, the question of identity is merely pushed off to the instances of mind. The FPR on such a
view is then the instance of mind and the thing which must be preserved for immortality to be
successful.
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Wiley’s point on primacy of mind also misses an important point; the reason the source
mind is awarded primacy is due to it being the antecedent instance of mind. It is logically and
ontologically prior to any instances that come after it. The source mind is rewarded primacy
because all derivative, uploaded minds depend on the source mind for their occurrences. Wiley
anticipates this conclusion but defends his shared primacy position concluding the confusion
comes from limitations in the semantics of the English language.197 For the reasons given, this is
more than an issue of semantics. The source mind must exist prior to the upload for any
uploading or splitting to occur. Therefore, the source mind holds primacy. It is not an issue of
semantics.
Any view of mind uploading compatible with substance dualism must transfer the mental
substance, i.e., the mind or soul, to the new substrate for the upload to successfully achieve
immortality. Many if not most transhumanists striving for mind uploading hold to physicalism
and avoid any form of dualism due to its common association with the spiritual and religious.
However, as has been mentioned already, for the FPR to transfer in the upload process, some
component of the self must exist independent of the material being replaced so that the FPR
continues to exist and is identical to itself while disembodied or transitioning to its new substrate.
Despite the physicalist’s ardent resistance to substance dualism, dualism ironically makes the
most sense of any version of mind uploading as a means of immortality, if such a transfer is
possible, because it has the greatest chance of preserving the FPR and meeting the other criteria
for immortality.
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If mind uploading could meet the criteria for immortality, a persisting FPR that is
singular in ontological history and total count of referents who endures indefinitely into the
future, what would be expected of the substrates? Consider a non-destructive upload where the
uploaded mind identifies as the person in her new substrate, but the original body is brain dead.
The mind would leave the body and is exchanged with the void of consciousness that the new
substrate held prior to the upload. If any uploading procedure is to succeed in granting personal
immortality, an exchange of animating life must be made, and whatever is exchanged is likely
immaterial to transfer between the material substrates and still retain its identity.
Perhaps the closest method proposed has been Gradual Replacement, but this only serves
to replace the original brain, which is only part of the body subject to decay and deterioration.
Additionally, if Searle is right, the gradual replacement of neurons would not seamlessly
transition to the new substrate but would likely cause the consciousness to gradually fade until it
was lost. The other proposed methods face the same hurdles that traditional brain-splitting
thought experiments face. Ultimately, each version’s struggles with maintaining the criteria for
personal immortality present insurmountable resistance to mind uploading providing a reliable
form of immortality where the identical FPR is preserved, the referent’s ontological history
remains the same, and the total count of minds after the upload are the same. Given these
complications, the Christian theistic view of resurrection will now be assessed in its ability to
meet these criteria and provide a means to personal immortality.
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Chapter 4
Christian Resurrection
Following the discussion on mind uploading’s inability to preserve one’s FPR, the focus
now turns to the Christian concept of bodily resurrection as a means of immortality. The first
section specifically outlines what is meant by resurrection as immortality. The next focus will be
on some expectations for resurrection, specifically regarding the role of being embodied, what
might happen during a disembodied state, and how resurrection is a step towards ultimate justice.
The following section identifies Jesus as the model for bodily resurrection, brief coverage on
historical facts grounding his resurrection in history, and how his resurrection models a general
future embodied state for all people. The importance of identity and resurrection is then reemphasized and the three criteria for immortality considered for resurrection. The final section
touches on the yearning for immortality people appear to have and provides a teleological
explanation for that yearning beyond avoiding oblivion.
Resurrection as Immortality
The Christian concept of resurrection is central to the movement as a faith system, not
just for the expectations of its believers for their own resurrection into immortality, but because
of Jesus Christ’s resurrection upon which the faith has been built. Consequently, Christians have
pontificated the details of Christian eschatology for over two millennia now. Cole-Turner
contrasts this long discussion on eschatology with the disagreements within the transhumanist
camp, noting the reason why transhumanism may have less quarreling on the topic is simply a
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matter of seniority: Christians have reflected on the future for 2000 years longer than thinkers
like Kurzweil and Wiley.198
To be clear on the terminology, in Christian eschatology, immortality and resurrection are
synonymous ideas. Not being mutually exclusive, Wright highlights how Paul’s writings on the
resurrection as a kind of immortality was not the combination of “two disparate beliefs; [Paul] is
simply describing resurrection itself, a new bodily life in which there can be no more death.”199
Expressions of immortality in Jewish, and therefore, Christian, teaching took the form of
resurrection as an expected future event where people would be raised bodily for the final
judgment as indicated in Daniel 12. This is different than the expectations of the transhumanist
where death is to be avoided, but it should be noted that the ancient world’s views on
immortality as they have been covered in chapter 2 all presuppose death.
While death is mostly expected in each view, including the resurrection view, early
teachings in Christianity also present immortality through resurrection as the solution to death.
Paul speaks extensively of resurrection and its role in “defeating” death. “For if the dead are not
raised, then Christ has not been raised either. And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is
futile; you are still in your sins” (1 Cor. 15:17-18). Paul speaks of a general resurrection where
the mortal will “clothe itself… with immortality,” and in that resurrected state, “‘Death has been
swallowed up in victory’” (1 Cor. 15:53-54). The obvious theme to this part of Paul’s letter is the
role that the resurrection has in overcoming death. The hold disembodiment and death have on a
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person is a temporary one for believers who, in Paul’s words, have “clothed themselves in the
imperishable.”
It is important to note here how Paul’s explanation of resurrection immortality is
“imperishable,” which is likely where Wright’s definition of immortality originates. Death and
“perishing” is no longer an issue in this view. This contrasts the immortality of mind uploading
where one’s continued existence is still dependent on the maintenance of the new substrate.200
Destruction of the substrate would have the same result as destruction of the original substrate,
i.e., the brain; the person would die. Also recall how Andrade’s definition of immortality
included not experiencing death.201 Early Christian concepts of the resurrection body clearly
portray it as a means of everlasting life not subject to death. Given these points on resurrection as
immortality, what should be expected of immortality in a resurrection context?
Resurrection Expectations
In contrast to the Platonic immortal soul and the astral body views, Judeo-Christian
resurrection view on the complete and ultimate state of a person is an embodied person.202 Recall
Descartes’ position on the soul’s role in interpreting bodily stimuli and directing it to “what is
beneficial.”203 Similarly, Aquinas took so seriously the role of embodiment that those who are
disembodied are not even considered human anymore. Even Jesus during his disembodied period
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of death was not considered by Aquinas to still be a human, though he was still considered divine
due to his divine nature still being connected to both matter and soul.204 While Descartes viewed
the body as important to the nature of the individual for sensory experiences, Aquinas considered
the person necessarily embodied to be human.
Also recall from the previous chapter the role embodiment has been playing in AI
research. Lorrimar claims AI researchers are “turning emphatically toward the body in their
work.”205 Kurzweil also expects the necessity for embodiment “since so much of our thinking is
directed toward physical needs and desires.”206 It can be more clearly seen why embodiment is
so important. From the Christian view, embodiment is the natural state of a human. The human is
incomplete without his body just as he may be when missing a hand or eye sight. So, if
embodiment is a view of human completion, what shall be said of the disembodied state
experienced during one’s death?
Most humans have already or will experience death and disembodiment.207 This state of
disembodied death has also been discussed in chapter 2 on the Resurrected Body, but again, the
conversation thus far has revealed perspectives that may contribute to the topic. Considering
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NDEs again, some people report to experience events and know information that would
otherwise be impossible were they totally unconscious after their clinical deaths. One such
popular story is that of Colton Burpo told in the book Heaven Is for Real.208 While discussing the
book, William Lane Craig in a podcast discusses Burpo’s experience as well as the risks
involved in taking the stories too seriously. Craig cautions listeners to remember that Scripture is
the “authoritative resource on matters of doctrine, including the theology of the afterlife.”209 Not
wanting to dismiss Burpo’s account, nor the hope and awe inspired in readers of his story, Craig
offers an interesting hypothetical explanation for how such experiences may square with the
Scriptures.
One of the complications Craig points out is that experiencers of NDEs often interact
with loved ones, sometimes people they have never met but are family, and they describe bodily
details of the person like hair color, apparent age, and so on. How can this be if the person’s
body and soul are separated? Have they already been resurrected in a sense? Wright hints at this
as a possible view, but he notes there is no Jewish teaching in support of such an expectation,
and consequently, there is no support for it in the Christian Scriptures either.210 These people do
not have photons bouncing off them and entering some spiritual eye such that they can be
visible. How might Burpo and the others be witnessing other deceased loved ones if they are not
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embodied? Craig’s clever suggestion is something akin to the virtual reality mind uploaders look
forward to.
“Suppose… in fact that God has so constituted souls in the intermediate state that they
project bodily images of themselves and one another for the purpose of mutual recognition and
interaction with each other.”211 This suggests God is enabling the soul or mind to experience
virtual, spiritual interactions with others for the continued aim of fellowship with himself and
others. Craig compares this to the popular movie series The Matrix, which conceptualizes the
scenario of humans interacting in a fictional world, the Matrix, but it is a fabrication impressed
upon their minds. They really interact with each other in this virtual space, but their physical
bodies are not directly interacting. In the case of NDEs, should Craig’s proposed idea be
accurate, there are no bodies for the dead to interact with in the intermediate state, but their
minds are connected through the grace of God so that they may interact consciously while they
await the final resurrection. Two things must be remembered, though. First, this is not the final
state of humans. It is only a waiting period for the final judgment. Embodiment is the natural and
complete state of a person. This intermediate state of “virtual” interactions is a grace provided to
the dead, if true. Second, this is a hypothetical view presented by Craig; it is conjecture to offer
explanation how NDEs might be true and still compatible with Scriptural teachings. Like the
NDE experiences themselves, it should not be taken as doctrine. It is just an interesting idea
allowing for elements of hope.
Finally, in addition to the expectation that resurrection facilitates human embodiment,
which is the intended state of humans and some probable intermediate state where souls await
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resurrection back into their bodies and the land of the living, this final resurrection inaugurates
the final resurrection of all souls. This is the event where the apparent injustices that occur
during life are finally addressed. Tyrants like Hitler who may have killed themselves before
receiving just punishment will receive it in full during this final judgment. Apart from this final
judgment, there is no ultimate justice.
The Christian view of resurrection holds that all people, just and unjust, will be raised for
their judgment, after which a new creation is ushered into existence (Rev. 21). As was discussed
on the soul criterion for personal identity, this final resurrection and subsequent judgment
requires the resurrected person to be identical with the one who died. A clone, even a divinelycreated clone, is not accountable for the actions of her source person. Only if a person is identical
by means of some personal soul can justice be served. Now, with the expectations laid out, the
model for the resurrection may be considered.
The Model for Resurrection – A Case Study
Jesus Christ is the standard model for resurrection in Christian teaching. It was through
Jesus’ resurrection that his previous teachings were ultimately and thoroughly vindicated. Up to
that point, the Jews were charging him with blasphemy regarding his declarations which were
frequently characterized by divine statements about Jesus himself and his relation to God his
Father (e.g., Matt. 26:64-65; cf. Psa. 110:1; Dan. 7:13). Once the resurrection had occurred and
the reports of Jesus’ post-mortem appearances to his disciples spread, which C. S. Lewis
identifies as “the first fact in the history of Christendom,” it was clear from the reports and
teachings of those first witnesses that Jesus had returned from the dead.212 These are not ghostly
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appearances like Wright covers when discussing popular Greco-Roman expectations of seeing
ghosts or visions of the dead, and Wright asserts “we should not make the mistake of supposing
that [these popular expectations] had anything to do with resurrection.”213
The historicity of Jesus’ resurrection is an important point that Lewis picks up on. While
it may be dismissed as a religious dogma or fairytale teaching, it has strong reasons for being
treated as a historical fact. Habermas has done extensive work supporting the historicity of the
resurrection, so only a summary of his points will be covered here. Habermas and Licona present
what they call the “minimal facts approach” to confirming the historicity of Jesus’
resurrection.214 First, Jesus was executed by crucifixion.215 Second, his disciples genuinely
believed he rose and appeared to them, evidenced by their proclamation of it and their radical
belief in his resurrection, which took them to their deaths.216 Paul, as well as various ancient oral
and written traditions, are the proclamations mentioned here; some of the earliest creeds support
this idea of an early belief in Jesus’ resurrection, as opposed to a later legend or myth. Habermas
and Licona are careful to remind their readers that their “minimal facts approach” is only dealing
with the facts and not with a canonical or authoritative teaching on Scripture; the New Testament
is treated as “an ancient volume of literature containing twenty-seven separate books and
letters.”217

213

Wright, Son of God, 64.

214

Gary R. Habermas and Michael R. Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI:
Kregel Publications, 2004), 48.
215

Ibid.

216

Ibid., 63.

217

Ibid., 51.

83

Third in their list of facts is the abrupt change in Saul of Tarsus, i.e., Paul, as an early
persecutor of the church to one of its most prolific advocates.218 Fourth, Jesus’ skeptical brother,
James, was also suddenly changed and became the leader of the Jerusalem church.219 Fifth,
Jesus’ tomb was empty, which was significant given the drama surrounding his death and burial
in Jerusalem, i.e., any doubters could easily check the tomb’s location, it was attested by the
Jewish leaders opposed to Jesus and his disciples, and it was attested to by his women followers,
which would not be a detail of the account if the disciples fabricated the account given the
diminished role women’s testimony played in ancient Judea.220 These details present a
comprehensive case for the resurrection of Jesus as a historical event, and the facts presented this
way are not based on religious tradition but on historical facts. So, how has this information
about Jesus’ resurrection influenced the Christian idea of resurrection, immortality, and one’s
identity?
Jesus was embodied physically upon his resurrection. Far from being some specter or
Greek shade, the disciples knew he was in a physical body. It is also not enough that he be in any
body, which is not resurrection but reincarnation. Following Geisler’s point, Jesus must have
been raised in his own body so “that the believer can triumphantly proclaim, ‘Where, O death, is
your victory? Where, O death, is your sting?’ (1 Cor. 15:55).”221 The conquering of death for
which the transhumanists strive is demonstrated most clearly in the body which died being raised
back to life. Jesus demonstrated it was his physical body raised again when he told Thomas to
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touch the wounds in his hands and side (John 20:27). For Thomas to handle his body and touch
his wounds, it was made evident that Jesus was embodied once more, not some ethereal, astral
specter. Similarly, the tangibility of his body excludes the possibility for a Platonic, permanently
disembodied, immaterial soul. The encounter clearly means to communicate Jesus’ resurrection
returned him to the same body in which he died.
It is also not enough to claim he was merely a heavenly vision. Jesus presents himself as
“flesh and bones” to the disciples before asking them for something to eat (Luke 24:39). Not
only does he assert his body is tangible and alive, but he proceeds to eat fish with them.
Similarly, the Gospel authors clearly point out when someone is having a spiritual vision instead
of seeing embodied people in their presence. Stephen saw Jesus standing at the right hand of God
as he was being stoned to death; Luke explicitly relays the event as a vision experience instead of
seeing a “physical” portal in space opening to heaven that all would have seen if they would
have looked (Acts 7:54-60). Jesus presents a model of the resurrection for people to be raised in
the last days.
Resurrection is also not just some arbitrary return to life. Jesus returned to life a purpose;
it was not just to demonstrate it could be done. It showed his followers, and the world, that death
was not the end, that humans belong in bodies, but also importantly, it points to a future event.
The future general resurrection is to follow his special resurrection. When all people in the future
are raised and judged according to their works. Jesus’ resurrection points to an eschatological
event and so too will the general resurrection. People are raised to judgment, some whose debt
has been paid in full by Jesus and applied to the believer’s account, and some whose debt sticks
with the individual who has not trusted Jesus’ works over their own. The model Jesus portrays
here is a bodily resurrection prepared for the final day of judgment and ultimate justice.
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Jesus is the model for the Christian’s hope of resurrection. Fully embodied, dining with
others, and purposefully aiming at the eschaton, the expectation for resurrection has been set, but
how does this view of resurrection align with immortality as it has been defined? Why should
adherents be confident in their identities being preserved in the resurrection?
Identity and Resurrection
Regarding one’s identity in the general resurrection, if there is any ultimate justice, it will
surely include judgment of the identical person who is responsible for the actions being judged.
This has been discussed elsewhere in this thesis, but it is an important point worth restating. For
justice to be served, the people responsible must be judged accordingly according to their
actions. This cannot happen without those same, identical people being held accountable. More
than one’s memories, more than one’s physical body, the immaterial soul which endures in the
intermediate state awaiting resurrection retains a person’s identity and is the same FPR in one’s
initial life, intermediate state of date, and return to life for the general resurrection.
Jesus was also the same person in life, death, and resurrected life. He interacted with the
disciples in an intimate manner that would be bizarre were the resurrected Jesus not the same as
the pre-mortem Jesus. For example, Jesus reinstates Peter after Peter denied him three times
during his trial (John 21:15-19). Also, Jesus showed himself to Thomas and challenged him to
believe since Thomas had experienced Jesus directly after his resurrection. The wounds act to
identify Jesus’ resurrection body with his old body as well as his familiar interactions with his
friends and disciples. Interestingly, despite the soul criterion being favored for the reasons
mentioned above, Jesus’ interactions with Peter depend on Peter’s bitter memories of the denials.
Also, Jesus’ interactions with Thomas depend on his bodily wounds from before death. The
memory and body criteria may have been ruled out, but they remain useful ways to identify a
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person with his past. This does not negate the reasons preferring for the soul criterion, but it
demonstrates the value of the body and memories as helpful tools for identification however
imperfect they may be.
Apart from serving ultimate justice, the central aim of immortality is not accomplished
unless the FPR is retained and identical to the referent in his first life. The chief reasons for most
of the mind uploading scenarios’ failures have been the inability to preserve the FPR.
Resurrection only succeeds if this central aim is successful. In the resurrection itself, whether
Jesus’ special resurrection or the general eschatological resurrection, the three criteria for
immortality are maintained. The resurrected person must be the same FPR as the individual who
died and whose actions will be judged. That same FPR’s ontological history continues from life
to death, to the intermediate state, and to the resurrection itself via a personal soul. Also, there is
an identical count to the number of FPRs before the resurrection as after.222 To have more than
one would generate the same problems of identity faced by mind uploading, but the problems
would be further compounded regarding the assigning of one’s responsibility to one’s life
actions. For these reasons, resurrection has succeeded in meeting the criteria for someone
expecting immortality.
How Christian Theism Explains the Desire for Immortality
One final point on Christian resurrection. Prima facie, the desire for immortality may be
for one to persist indefinitely into the future, largely because the fear of oblivion and annihilation
terrifies people. However, there appears to be another reason deeper than just self-preservation.
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Rather than appealing to self-interest and self-preservation, the deeper purpose for seeking
immortality and everlasting life is to continue in fellowship with God and others. Everlasting life
implies life has some meaning worth persisting forever, but what is that meaning? When asked
what the most important commandment was, Jesus answered to “love the Lord your God with all
your [heart, soul, mind, and strength]” and to “love your neighbor as yourself” (Matt. 22:37, 39).
In a teleological sense, then, the most important things a person can do is have a right
relationship with God and others, so rather than focusing on one’s self, it is best to focus on
others instead. In other words, the meaning of life is building others-focused relationships.
Everlasting life is then an everlasting mission to this end. The reason Christian resurrection to
immortality coheres best and is successful is partly because the FPR is preserved singly through
the major events of life and death. Also, in each state of life and death, others-focused
relationships are facilitated by God.223
Conversely, in addition to this point, if the facilitator and source of life is abandoned or
rejected, so too are life and relationships. Whatever disembodied consciousness exists for people,
that state, apart from God, life, and relationships, is naturally left with death, isolation, and
separation. The Bible tells of the final judgment and those who will not be found in “the book of
life” will be subject to “the second death” (Rev. 20:11-15). Immortality then is not merely meant
to allow an individual to endure forever, it is meant to continue the fellowship life provides.
The desire for immortality reflects a teleological purpose to human nature. More than
having one’s self exist forever, it indicates the desire to accomplish some end that is innate and
purposeful. What value would life be without a driving purpose? This is like Aristotle and

This assertion regarding relationships in death admittedly assumes something like Craig’s explanation
for NDEs is accurate and post-mortem consciousness is a reality.
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Aquinas’ view on intentionality, which is not just a mental focus on some object or goal but is
also what Aristotle would call “final causality,” even if the mind is unaware of the purpose.224
The desire for immortality stems from the intrinsic feature in all humans to live on in embodied
life to fulfill the relational purposes that shape much of the human life.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The long-sought after goal of immortality and everlasting life has inspired contemplation,
literature, spirituality, and innovation. The objective for an individual to gain immortality is to
persist into the future as they do in life; one’s self, the first-person referent and subjective
perspective, must continue consciously in life to be immortal. The criteria defined for
immortality has been framed to accomplish this simple goal of the persisting self. The self must
endure, and any branching, splitting, or duplicate instances of one’s personality and memories
are not enough to accomplish the FPR’s everlasting endurance, so there must be a single,
identical ontological history that could be traced from a perfect observer’s perspective which
would not be tainted by uncertainty. Coupling this history with the same number of FPRs
possessing that same reference to the self, immortality has thus been defined.
Mind uploading fails in this pursuit. The closest it comes to success is in gradually
replacing the brain so that maybe the FPR remains intact and identical to whoever or whatever
self-identifies as the uploaded person, but if Searle is right, even gradual replacement may
destroy consciousness. Non-destructive procedures most clearly fail because the source mind
remains with its same FPR while the upload enjoys the benefits of the innovated substrate it
would then call home. The essential failure here is that the source person was not uploaded, the
person would be simulated or copied, at best. Destructive procedures likely result in a single
mind, though not necessarily. While the source mind is not present to complicate issues of
identity, the destruction of the previous substrate masks whether any actual transfer has occurred.
Many ideas are available for research, but the fundamental problem of consciousness, i.e.,
humanity’s critical ignorance of how it works, is still a hinderance.
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Christian resurrection offers a better explanation for how personal immortality can be
obtained. Granted, a period of death in an intermediate state of post-mortem consciousness may
await everyone, that does nothing to diminish the prospects of a general resurrection where all
are resurrected into immortal bodies. Jesus of Nazareth’s models this in his special resurrection
marking the success of his life’s work on earth. He demonstrates the resurrection is a physical,
embodied one, complete with a capacity for eating, physical interactions with others, and
identifying features of the body. Ultimately, Christian teaching predicts that all people will be
resurrected and present in a final eschatological judgment day where their deeds are weighed (2
Cor. 5:10) and those trusting in Jesus’ works rather than their own will be ushered into an
everlasting life of fellowship with God and others (Rom. 3:20-24). Those who choose to be apart
from that are left with the absence of life and fellowship with God and others. After all, no
forced relationship is built on the love for another over self, and this extends even to God.
An intriguing reminder is that the transhumanist and Christian share the same hope in
eschatological outcomes. Both want the abolition of sickness, disease, and death. Both want to be
radically transformed and enter a new state of everlasting life. The difference is in the approach.
Freedom from sickness, disease, and death, as well as being transformed and gaining everlasting
life, are found in Christ demonstrated by his own resurrection to immortality. The human attempt
to simulate what God has already done again shows that there is “nothing new under the sun”
(Ecc. 1:9). Technology, though powerful and helpful, does not achieve what Jesus already has,
and trust is best placed in Jesus rather than technology (Psa. 20:7). There are good reasons to
believe in Jesus’ resurrection and the hope in a life to come, as well as a hope in new life here
and now (2 Cor. 5:17; 1 Pet. 3:15).
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